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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, we develop a model to investigate some implications of single and multiple 
submissions policies of academic journals. We make the following four assumptions. First, 
authors are identical and they produce papers with the same quality distribution; Second, there are 
only two journals and their quality standards are common knowledge; Third, the errors in the 
referee’s assessment of papers’ quality are uncorrelated. Finally, if a paper is rejected by a journal 
it can not be resubmitted to the same journal in the future. We find that if multiple submissions 
were allowed, the average quality of accepted papers could be higher or lower than those in the 
single submission case. Therefore, a multiple-submission policy may not necessarily deteriorate 
the quality of published papers. In addition, we find that, as authors become less patient they are 
more likely to choose multiple submissions, and if authors are sufficiently patient they never 
choose multiple submissions. Thus, authors who are not very patient suffer more from the 
prevailing policy of prohibiting multiple submissions. We also found that under the situation that 
authors are patient enough, whether multiple-submission may occur in their optimal submission 
strategy depends on the magnitude of publication benefit in the high quality journal. When the 
publication benefit in the high quality journal is small enough, authors will never include 
multiple-submission in their optimal strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1.  OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Recent studies indicate that there has been a trend of increasing length in publication process in 
many disciplines over the last several decades. The increasing publication delay in academic 
journals has caused criticism by scholars because publications are the primary route for them to 
get promotion, tenure, salary increase and recognition. Many scholars tried to understand the 
cause of the slowdown in the publication process. Azar (2003) divided the delay in publication 
process into four stages and argued that previous studies about the delay have ignored the 
rejection-and-revision stage (the time between the submission of a manuscript to the first journal 
and its submission to the journal that eventually publishes it). After accounting for this stage, the 
first response time (FRT, the time between submission and first decision in the journal in which 
the manuscript is eventually published) will have a much more important impact on the 
publication delay because it may delay the process more than once since manuscripts are often 
rejected from more than one journal before being accepted. Azar (2002) provided evidence that 
the FRT of economics journals has increased from about 1-2 months to 4-5 months over the last 
four decades. 
 
Most of the scholarly journals prohibit multiple submissions.
1
 There is a debate concerning the 
desirability of allowing multiple submissions. Szenberg (1994) argued that allowing multiple 
submissions can speed up the decision time involved in getting papers accepted for publication 
because it would make the editorial process more competitive and  it would also lead to quicker 
acceptances through elimination of “rejection waiting time” (having to wait for one rejection 
before being able to send a paper to another journal). Pressman (1994) argued that multiple 
submissions would not substantially reduce the response time on individual papers, and it may 
                                                 
1
 The law discipline is an exception. Law journals do permit multiple submissions. (Posner, 2004 ) 
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increase the number of submissions of low-quality papers to top journals, thus increasing the 
workload of referees and editors without any significant benefit in terms of the quality of research 
published.  Although there is an intense debate, there are very few formal models on this issue so 
far. In this paper, we develop a model to investigate some implications of single and multiple 
submissions policies of academic journals. We make the following four assumptions. First, 
authors are identical and know their papers’ true quality perfectly; Second, there are only two 
journals and their quality standards are common knowledge; Third, the errors in the referees’ 
assessment of papers’ quality are uncorrelated. Finally, if a paper is rejected by a journal, it can 
not be resubmitted to the same journal in the future.   
 
From the analysis on authors’ submission strategy, we find in a multi-period setting, that given 
the ratio of publication benefit to submission fee in the low quality journal, if authors’ are patient 
enough they will never submit their papers to both journals simultaneously. Otherwise, whether 
multiple-submission may occur in their optimal submission strategy depends on the magnitude of 
the publication benefit in the high quality journal. When the publication benefit in the high 
quality journal is small enough, authors will never include multiple-submission as part of their 
optimal strategy. When the publication benefit in the high quality journal is relatively large, a 
multiple-submission strategy may be optimal.  
 
Through numerical simulations, we find that if multiple submissions were allowed, the average 
quality of accepted papers could be higher or lower than those in the single submission case. 
Therefore, a multiple-submission policy may not necessarily deteriorate the quality of published 
papers. We also find that, as authors become less patient, they are more likely to choose multiple 
submissions, and if authors are sufficiently patient they never choose multiple submissions. Thus, 
authors who are not very patient suffer more from the prevailing policy of prohibiting multiple 
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submissions. From the simulation results, we also find that a less (more) patient author is more 
likely to submit his paper to the low (high) quality journal. 
 
 
1.2 Organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review on the publication 
process. Chapter 3 presents the modeling setup and investigates the submission strategy in the 
basic model. Chapter 4 performs numerical simulations on an author’s submission strategy in the 
single and multiple-submission cases. Chapter 5 makes the concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter introduces the literature on the publication process. First, we organize the literature 
about a delayed publication process and present the empirical and theoretical analysis results by 
some scholars. Second, we introduce the literature about the peer review system. Third, we 
present the literature about citations as measurement of papers’ quality. Fourth, we introduce the 
arguments on a “single-submission” or “multiple-submission” policy. We conclude by 
summarizing some suggestions for further research, and introduce the motivation for our model. 
 
 
2.1 The delayed publication process 
 
 
The publishing process plays an important role in both the dissemination and certification of 
scientific knowledge. Recent studies indicate that there has been a trend of delayed publishing 
process in many disciplines over the last few decades. In particular, Ellison (2002a) found that 
over the last 30 years there has been a substantial slowdown of the publishing process in the 
economics discipline (see table 1) and figure 1 shows the mean submit-accept times for papers 
published at  top economics journals. Based on a database which concerns the author’s own 66 
published papers in 28 different journals for the period of 1990-1999, Franses (2002a) 
constructed a group of descriptive statistics, such as submission-first response time, revision-
decision time and decision-publication time, then provided some model-based regression results 
which reinforces one of the findings in Ellison (2002a) that the publishing process now takes 
longer.       
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                          Table 1: Mean submit-accept times at various journals 
Journal               Mean total review time in year 
  1970                    1980                     1990                   1999 
                               Top five general interest journals 
American Economic Review                             a13.5                     12.7 
Econometrics   b8.8                   b14.0                     b22.9                b26.3 
Journal of Political Economy                             9.5                         13.3                  20.3 
Quarterly Journal of Economics   8.1                     12.7                       22.0                  13.0 
Review of Economic Studies   b10.9                  21.5                      21.2                  28.8 
                              Other general interest journals 
Canadial Journal of Economics                             a11.3                                              16.6 
Economic Inquiry                             a3.4                                                13.0 
Economic Journal                             a9.5                                                 b18.2 
International Economic Review    b7.8                  b11.9                    b15.9                  b16.8 
Review of Economics and Statistics    8.1                    11.4                      13.1                   18.8 
                               Economic field journals 
Journal of Applied Econometrics                                                          b16.3                  b21.5 
Journal of Comparative Economics                            b10.3                     b10.9                  b10.1 
Journal of Development Economics   bc5.6                b6.4                       b12.6                  b17.3 
Journal of Econometrics                            b9.7                       b17.6                  b25.5 
Journal of Economic Theory   b0.6                  b6.1                       b17.0                  b16.4 
Journal of Environmental Ec. & Man.                            b5.5                       b6.6                    b13.1 
Journal of International Economics                            a8.7                                                 16.2 
Journal of Law and Economics                            a6.6                                                 14.8 
Journal of Mathematical Economics    bc2.2                b7.5                       17.5                    8.5 
Journal of Monetary Economics                                                           b11.7                 b16.0 
Journal of Public Economics    bc2.6               b12.5                      b14.2                 b9.9 
Journal of Urban Economics                            b5.4                        b10.3                 b8.8 
RAND Journal of Economics                            a7.2                        20.0                   20.9 
                               Journals in related fields 
Accounting Review                           10.1                          20.7                  14.5 
Journal of Accounting and 
Economics                           b11.4                         b12.5                b11.5 
Journal of Finance                           a6.5                                                    18.6 
Journal of Financial Economics    bc2.6              b7.5                           b12.4                b14.8 
 
Note:  The table is from Ellison (2002a) and records the mean time between initial submission and 
acceptance for articles published in various journals in various years.  
 
(a) Data from Yohe (1980) is for 1979 and probably does not include the review time for the final    
resubmission. 
(b) Does not include review time for final resubmission. 
(c) Data for 1974. d - Data for 1972. 
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Figure 1: Mean submit-accept times for papers in top general interest journals 
Note: The figure is from Ellison (2002a) 
 
 
There are many theoretical and empirical studies on the issue of publication process. Franses 
(2002a) mentioned that there are mainly two types of studies. The first type considers how the 
papers proceeded through the editorial process and the second type is concerned with what 
happens to the papers once they have been published. As is illustrated in Franses (2002b), very 
successful papers in economics and econometrics can get around 150 citations per year for a 
period of a decade. The author stated that there are very few studies that follow the full life cycle 
of individual papers over time. In his article, Franses conducted an empirical analysis to study the 
full life cycle of papers, ranging from submission to citations. The analysis was based on a 
database which concerns the author’s own 66 published papers in 28 different journals for the 
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period of 1990-1999. According to the information contained in the database, the author provides 
two types of descriptive statistics: one concerns the published papers, such as standardized 
citations, whether the paper appeared in a special issue or not, the number of pages, the number of 
references, the number of prior rejections and so on; the other type is concerned with the editorial 
process, such as submission-first response time, revision-decision time and decision-publication 
time. The author provided some model-based regression results and an important conclusion 
which reinforces the findings in Ellison (2002a) that the editorial process now takes longer and 
that only a few papers get frequently cited.  
 
The delayed publishing process has received a lot of criticism because it makes the dissemination 
of knowledge slower and it may cause the entire chain of research to be delayed since new 
research builds on previous works. Many scholars tried to figure out the reason of the slowdown 
in the publishing process. Ellison (2002a) provided some potential explanations for the delayed 
publishing process in economics. He attributed part of the slowdown to a few changes in the 
economics profession. By using time-series data, he examined whether the change has actually 
occurred and by using cross-section data he examined the hypothesized relationship between the 
change and the slowdown. He analyzed four exogenous changes in the profession. 
 
The first change is the “democratization” of the publishing process and this may lengthen the 
review time of papers. But time-series data on the characteristics of accepted papers showed there 
has not been significant democratization over the past three decades and cross-section data 
doesn’t support this hypothesis either. The second change is an increase in the complexity of 
economics papers. Some tests support this complexity-based explanation but others do not. The 
third change is the growth in the economics profession and this might slow the review process at 
top journals through two effects: it may increase the workload of editors and it may increase 
competition for the limited space in journals. According to the results of the regression, the author 
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concluded that the first effect was hard to support and the second effect may account for three or 
four months of the slowdown at the top journals.  The fourth change is in the costs and benefits of 
revising papers. One argument is that the improvements in computer technology reduced the cost 
of revisions and journals may ask for more revisions. The other argument is that more revisions 
are optimal because journals may be less in the business of disseminating information and more 
in the business of certifying the quality of papers. But these explanations can not be supported by 
evidence.  
 
Ellison (2002a) concluded that it is hard to attribute the majority of the slowdown to observable 
changes in the economics profession and he tried to provide an alternative hypothesis: the 
slowdown could reflect a shift in social norms. Ellison (2002b) developed a model in which 
social norms would evolve in the direction of emphasizing revisions and hence a delayed 
publishing process, given the assumption that academics are subject to overconfidence bias (they 
think their work is slightly better than what it really is).  In this article, the author developed a 
two-dimensional quality model to explain the trends in academic publishing process: academic 
journals require extensive revisions of submissions and articles are becoming longer.  
 
Firstly, the author formulated a simple static model of academic publishing. The main actors in 
this model are a continuum of academics (of unit mass). Each of them is endowed with one unit 
of time and may write one paper. Papers have a two-dimensional quality, q and r. The q-
dimension reflects the contribution of the main idea of the paper and the r-dimension reflects 
other aspects of quality, such as robustness checks, extensions, and discussions of related 
literature. There is one journal which publishes a mass τ  of papers with 0 1τ< < . Academics’ 
preferences are lexicographic in publications and leisure, which implies they attempt to maximize 
the probability of publishing an article in the journal. The social norm ( , )zα for evaluating papers 
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is common knowledge. Papers are regarded as worthy of publication if and only if 
(1 )q r zα α+ − ≥ .  The model is described as a four-step process with three groups of players. In 
the first stage, academics choose the fraction [0,1]qt ∈  of their time to devote to developing the 
main idea of the paper. In the second stage, academics submit their papers to the journal. The 
journal’s referees correctly assess the q-quality of the paper and report that it will be acceptable 
for publication if and only if it can be revised to achieve an r-quality of at least ( )r q   as defined 
by (1 ) ( )q r q zα α+ − = . In the third stage, academics choose the amount of time [0,1 ]r qt t∈ −  to 
spend on revisions. In the fourth stage, editors accept the fraction τ  of papers for which 
(1 )q rα α+ −  is highest for publication. An equilibrium of the static model is a quadruple 
* *
( , , , ( ))q rz t t qα  such that 
*
qt  and 
*( )rt q  are chosen to maximize the probability that 
(1 )q r zα α+ − ≥  and the fraction of papers with (1 )q r zα α+ − ≥  is exactly τ . And ( , )zα  in 
this equilibrium is called a consistent social norm. Analysis of the equilibrium may provide a few 
explanations for an increase in r-quality hence the trends in academic publishing (trends in 
academic publishing mentioned above can be thought of as reflecting an increase in the r-quality 
of published papers). 
 
For this static model, a continuum of social norms is possible. Differences in social norms 
provide a potential explanation for differences in the publishing process across fields or over time. 
In order to investigate whether social norms might tend to shift, the author developed a dynamic 
model to examine the evolution of social norms that is consistent with observed trends. The most 
important actors in the dynamic model are the journal’s referees who can learn the prevailing 
social norm from two sources: seeing what revisions they are asked to make on their own papers 
and whether editors accept or reject papers they refereed.  With the assumption that academics 
have no overconfidence bias ( 0ε = ), the author analyzed the basic version of this dynamic model 
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and concluded that it cannot explain the long gradual trends. By adding the assumption that 
academics are subject to overconfidence bias (they think their work is slightly better than it really 
is),  the result is a gradual evolution of social norms to higher weight on r-quality. This dynamics 
is slow and steady and may be a candidate for explaining observed trends in academic publishing. 
 
Azar (2003) divided the delay in publishing process into four stages: 
1)  “Rejection-and-revision time”: the time between the submission of a manuscript to the 
first journal and its submission to the journal that eventually publishes it. 
2) “First response time in the publishing journal”: the time between submission and first 
decision in the journal in which the manuscript is eventually published. 
3) “Revision time”: the time between the first editorial decision and the acceptance of the 
article. 
4) “Forthcoming-article delay”: the time between acceptance of the article and its actual 
publication in print. 
 
Azar (2003) argued that previous studies about the delay caused by the review process ignored 
the rejection-and-revision time and looked on the life cycle of an article starting at the point at 
which it was submitted to the journal that eventually published it. After accounting for the 
rejection-and-revision stage, the first response time (FRT) will have a much more important 
impact on the publication delay because it delays the process more than once as manuscripts are 
often rejected from one or more journals before being accepted for publication. Using empirical 
evidence about acceptance rates of journals with different rankings, the author estimated the 
average number of journals to which a manuscript is submitted before being published. The 
results indicate that given the possible submission strategies, a manuscript with an average quality 
level is likely to be submitted to three to six different journals before it is accepted for publication. 
The author said that this result has an important policy implication for journal editors: the 
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reduction in the FRT is much more important than the reduction in any other stages of the 
publication delay. In addition, the estimated number of submissions also gives an idea about the 
costs of the refereeing process per article published. 
 
Azar (2007) provided evidence that the first response time (the time from submission of a 
manuscript to first editorial decision; FRT) of economics journals has increased from about 1-2 
months to 4-5 months over the last forty years. Realizing the fact that it only takes referees 
several hours to referee a paper, the author wondered why referees leave papers in the pile for a   
much longer time today than in the past and he suggested two reasons: one is that the optimal 
FRT for the society is longer today; the other is that the social norm of how much time it should 
take to referee a paper has increased. The author argued that the cost of delaying a paper’s 
publication is smaller than in the past because articles can also be available in working paper 
series or on the website prior to publication, hence the cost of a longer FRT has decreased. Also, 
he argued that a longer FRT creates a benefit because it can reduce the cost of the refereeing 
process by reducing the number of submissions of low-quality papers to good journals. Then the 
author formulated a model to illustrate that these changes in the costs and benefits of a longer 
FRT lead to an increase in the optimal FRT. 
 
Azar (2007) argued that refereeing time can be thought of as a social norm because referees care 
about how long it takes their colleagues to review a paper. Taking into account the various 
preferences of referees including their desire to conform to the social norm and the extent to 
which they care about the profession’s welfare (the optimal FRT), he presented a model to 
examine the evolution of the social norm of refereeing time and how the refereeing time reacts to 
changes in the optimal FRT. The results showed that the social norm about how much time it 
should take to referee a paper has increased and even if many referees do not care about the 
optimal FRT, almost every referee increases his or her refereeing time following an increase in 
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the optimal FRT. However, the analysis of the evolution of the social norm in Azar (2007) differs 
from that in Ellison (2002b). Azar (2007) included the social norm into the structure of referees’ 
preferences and assumed that referees know the level of social norms in each period. In Azar’s 
model, the fact that referees care about the welfare of the profession and the longer optimal FRT 
for the society have driven the social norm of refereeing time to increase over time. In Ellison 
(2002b), referees review papers according to the profession’s standard or the social norm, but 
they don’t know the exact level of social norms in each period  and try to infer it from personal 
experiences ( whether editors accept or reject the papers they refereed ). Assuming that academics 
are subject to overconfidence bias when judging the quality of their own work, such attempts to 
learn the prevailing norm lead to a shift in social norms. 
 
The delay caused by the review process makes the dissemination of research slower and it may 
cause the entire chain of research to be delayed because new research builds on previous work. 
The first response time is an important part of the delay. Editors of many economics journals try 
to reduce the FRT in their journals and most people believe that it is welfare improving. But Azar 
(2005) questioned this common belief. By analyzing the structure of costs and benefits in the 
academic profession, he argued that reducing the FRT may increase the number of submissions of 
low-quality papers to top journals, thus increasing the workload of referees and editors without 
any significant benefit in terms of the quality of research published.  
 
Then he formulated a model about how the optimal submission strategy is determined to illustrate 
his argument. In his model, for a certain manuscript, there is a finite set of journals that may 
publish it and these journals are ranked according to their quality. The author found that given the 
submission fee and FRT of level-1 journals (top journals), there is a cutoff probability π , if an 
author estimates his acceptance chances are higher than π , it is optimal for him to submit his 
paper to level-1 journals, otherwise he is better off submitting the paper to a low-ranked journal. 
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According to the model, shortening the FRT reduces the cutoff probability, hence induces more 
submissions of low-quality papers to top journals. Hence, since shortening the FRT might not be 
beneficial, the author says that from a social point of view a longer FRT might even be better than 
the current FRT.  
 
In order to overcome the problem of excessive submissions and gain from reducing the FRT, 
Azar (2006) suggests the following four ideas that might achieve this goal：increasing 
submission fees, requiring authors to review papers in proportion to the number of papers they 
submit, using differential delays conditional on the paper’s quality, and banning papers from 
being submitted after a certain number of rejections. After discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of these ideas, Azar (2006) proposed a few ideas for further research, e.g., how 
much time should referees invest in suggesting improvements to a paper they recommend to 
reject? (There is a trade-off between giving the author as much helpful feedback as possible and 
saving the referee’s time).  
 
 
 
 
2.2 The peer review system 
The role of the publishing process in certifying the quality of scientific knowledge is mainly 
through the peer review system. Referees of journals are often paid nothing or much less than 
their time cost for their review work. Engers and Gans (1998) formulated a model to explain why 
referees are willing to perform their task without payment and why editors and publishers do not 
find it worthwhile to pay referees to improve their performance. In this model, they assume that 
referees are concerned about the quality of academic journals and their impact upon this. It was 
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also assumed that the higher the level of participation of referees, the greater is the journal’s 
quality as better articles are attracted by the quick reviewing process.  
They examined a referee’s decision to participate in the reviewing process. The model predicted 
that under quite general conditions, although monetary incentives could play a role in improving 
the journal quality by eliciting a greater review rate, the increase in journal quality reduces the 
need for referees to incur private costs to enhance the quality, hence greater payments are 
required to maintain the higher participation rate. They showed that using monetary incentives to 
motivate referees, while resulting in an improvement in journal quality, is so costly that it makes 
such incentives unprofitable, thus editors optimally set referee’s payment to zero. In this paper, 
they also demonstrate that a concern for the journal quality causes both editors and referees to fail 
to fully internalize the effects of their choices on others. Therefore, even though a positive 
payment would result in a socially beneficial improvement of journal quality, the equilibrium 
payment to referees by editors is zero. They suggested that an appropriate subsidy to referees by a 
third party could enhance the welfare. 
 
Several studies examine the effectiveness of the peer review system in quality control. The study 
by Rowland (2002) indicated that there are many problems involved in this system, such as 
subjectivity, bias, abuse, fraud and misconduct. Scholars have made a few suggestions for 
improvement, like “open peer review” suggested by Williamson (2002) and a web-based 
reviewing system suggested by Weller (2001). Armstrong (1997) tried to review all published 
empirical literature concerning journal peer review. He examined how the “quality control” and 
“fairness to authors” work and found that the current system of peer review which aimed at 
assuring quality and fairness may discourage innovative findings. Then he suggested the 
following changes in journal peer review to encourage the publication of papers with innovative 
findings: 
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．  Invited papers 
． Early acceptance procedures 
．  Simultaneous submissions 
． Pre-submission reviews 
． Nomination of reviewers by authors 
． Results-blind reviews 
． Structured review forms 
． Open peer review 
． Alternate formats 
 
In particular, Armstrong (1997) mentioned that electronic publishing by journals can help to solve 
the problem of scarce resources and it may replace traditional paper journals as a primary channel 
for innovative findings. To encourage the publication of innovative findings, he also provided 
some suggestions for editors, reviewers and authors. He emphasized that the basic principle 
behind the screening procedure should be changed from whether to publish a paper to how to 
publish it and the effects on quality and fairness should also be assessed at the same time.  
 
Blank (1991) investigated the impact of single-blind versus double-blind reviewing using data 
from a unique randomized experiment conducted from May 1987 through the end of May 1989 at 
The American Economic Review (AER). In this experiment, approximately one-half of the 
submitted papers were assigned to double-blind reviewing and the other papers were assigned to 
single-blind reviewing. The data provided information on the gender and institutional rank of 
both author and referee, the acceptance rates and referee ratings of papers, and how many authors 
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of double-blind papers can actually be identified by the referee. The primary conclusions are as 
follows: 
 
1)  There are significant differences in acceptance rates and referee ratings between single-blind   
and double-blind papers. Double-blind papers have lower acceptance rates and lower referee 
evaluations. 
 
2) There are differences in the acceptance rates across institutional categories between single-
blind and double-blind papers. Authors at the top-ranked and low-ranked institutions are little 
affected, but authors at near-top-ranked institutions have lower acceptance rates under 
double-blind reviewing. 
 
3) Female authors do slightly better under double-blind reviewing in terms of acceptance rates 
and referee ratings, but the effects are small and statistically insignificant. 
 
4) Female referees tend to give lower ratings to non-blind papers and tend to give higher ratings 
to blind papers, while male referees show the opposite pattern. 
 
5) “Truly blind” papers (those papers assigned to double-blind reviewing that cannot be 
identified by referees) are a selected group of the blind papers (the authors of truly blind 
papers are usually from low-ranked institutions and have little experience and fame in the 
profession). By using an instrumental-variable procedure to control for all factors other than 
true anonymity, the effect of being in the truly blind group on the acceptance rates is smaller 
and less significant 
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Laband (1990) suggests that the peer review process functions not only as a screening mechanism 
to separate low quality papers from high quality ones, but it assists authors in the production of 
publishable papers, which implies that editors, referees and authors are complementary inputs in 
the production of published scientific knowledge. Laband (1990) estimated a knowledge 
production function, one element of which is the editor/referee input. Based on information 
provided by authors of papers published in several of the top economics journals during 1976-
1980, he constructed a number of alternative measures of the editor/referee input, such as 
comments provided by reviewers and editors. Using subsequent citations of published papers as 
the measure of quality of knowledge, he examined the relationship between editor/referee input 
and the citations of published papers. The results indicated that reviewers’ comments demonstrate 
a positive impact on subsequent citations of published papers, while editors’ comments show no 
such impact. This implies that value-adding by editors derives basically from efficient matching 
of manuscripts and reviewers. 
 
Do editors work efficiently? There are many studies on the behavior of editors.  Journal editors 
who publish papers authored by colleagues and former graduate students are often charged with 
practicing favoritism. Gerrity and Mckenzie (1978) and Laband (1985) offered evidence to the 
effect that a large fraction of articles published in The Journal of Political Economy (JPE) were 
authored by scholars with ties to the University of Chicago. The papers treated with favoritism 
are usually deemed as of lower quality than those written by scholars with no ties to the editor.  
Laband and Piette (1994a) tried to examine the relationship between quality of papers and an 
author’s personal ties to the editor. 
 
The authors compiled data on 1,051 full articles published in 28 top economics journals in 1984 
to examine the relationship between quality of papers and an author’s personal ties to the editor. 
They investigated the extent to which an author’s personal ties to the editor of a journal 
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influenced subsequent citations to published articles, controlling for author, article, and journal-
specific characteristics that might influence citations. The empirical results show that although 
journal editors occasionally publish substandard papers authored by colleagues and former 
graduate students, their use of professional connections enables them to find high-impact papers 
for publication. The evidence indicates that the beneficial impact dominates any harm derived 
from favoritism, so the use of professional connections by editors enables them to find high-
impact papers for publication, which implies that “favoritism” may enhance efficiency in the 
market for scientific knowledge.  
 
 
2.3 Citations as measurement of papers’ quality 
The peer review system plays an important role in certifying the quality of scientific knowledge 
and the standard of measuring the quality or impact of published knowledge is primarily based on 
their subsequent citations. Franses (2002b) illustrated that very successful papers in economics 
and econometrics can get about 150 citations per year for a period of a decade. There is a debate 
on the use of citations as the measurement of the impact of published articles, the rankings of 
journals, departments and individual researchers. But so far, the citation method is still widely 
used in academics and has been set as a standard measuring rod in evaluating and rewarding 
effort.  
 
There are a lot of papers on citation analysis. Based on the procedure used by Bush, Hamelman 
and Staaf (1974), Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) constructed an impact-adjusted citation index to 
calculate the ranking of economics journals. According to the information provided by the Social 
Science Citation Index (SSCI), they first ranked the journals by the total number of citations 
received from other journals in 1980. This ranking reflected a journal’s accumulated impact on 
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current authors because the cited articles may have been published at any time during the life of 
the journal. Journals of recent birth had a much smaller inventory of articles to be cited and in this 
ranking procedure will be at a disadvantage relative to longer-lived journals. For this reason, they 
used the citations to articles published in the 1975-1979 period to measure the recent impact of 
journals. Considering that a journal’s impact on highly influential journals was more valuable 
than its impact on less influential journals, the authors provided a procedure to calculate the 
ranking of journals by using the impact-adjusted citations. In order to investigate which journals 
are likely to provide the greatest impact for any given manuscript, they also created two rankings 
by controlling for the size of journals: one was based on citations per character and the other was 
based on citations per article. This impact-adjusted citation method analyzed in L-P has many 
followers and is widely used in the ranking of journals.  
 
Amir (2002) investigated the properties of different ranking methods and made a critical 
assessment of various impact-adjusted measures, in particular the one proposed by L-P (1984). 
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) introduced an axiomatic method to the problem of how to rank 
journals on the basis of their mutual citations. By comparing different ranking methods according 
to the properties they satisfy and fail to satisfy, they concluded that the invariant method (which 
was first proposed by Pinski and Narin (1976)) is the only one that can satisfy simultaneously the 
list of four proposed properties simultaneously. They also claimed that the invariant ranking 
method based on citations is not the only correct way of measuring impact or quality, and citation 
analysis, however sophisticated it may be, cannot be a substitute for critical reading and expert 
judgment.  
 
Laband and Tollison (2003) have shown that in spite of the growth between 1974 and 1996 of 
resources invested in academic economic research, the percentage of un-cited papers remained 
constant at about 26 percent (in the five years subsequent to their publication). Van Dalen and 
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Henkens (2004) mentioned that one outstanding feature of scientific publication and citation 
behavior is the skewness: most articles receive few or no citations and a few receive numerous 
citations. They argued that the extreme skewed distribution of citations is that many publications 
that go unnoticed for a considerable number of years may suddenly attract a lot of attention (so-
called ‘sleeping beauties’). Furthermore, Van Dalen and Klamer (2005) did some calculations and 
showed that on a global scale the scientific publication industry costs the world only 0.0006 
percent of global income and argued that the information based on citation statistics cannot prove 
that science is a wasteful competition, actually waste is part of science and competition. 
 
Some social science departments and business schools place extreme emphasis on publications in 
prestigious journals. Articles in high-status journals usually receive more citations than articles in 
low-status journals. Starbuck (2005) asked how much more these articles contribute to knowledge 
and he said that it makes no sense to judge articles solely on the journals in which they are 
published. In this article, the author used data about the review process to frame a statistical 
analysis of differences between the top 20%, the middle 40% and the bottom 40% of journals in 
four fields: economics, psychology, sociology and management.  
 
The analysis indicates that although higher-status journals publish more high-value articles, 
editorial selection involves considerable randomness. High-status journals publish a few low 
value articles, low-status journals publish some excellent articles and some of the articles which 
belong in the highest-value 20% may receive successive rejections from several journals.  
Starbuck (2005) concluded that for most departments and schools, extreme emphasis on 
publication in top journals has a significant probability of introducing randomness because the 
confidence intervals of the true value of articles associated with such publications are very wide. 
Because articles published in high-status journals receive more citations and hence exert more 
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influence on scientific value, such a focus on high-status journals may impede the development of 
knowledge when less-valuable articles receive the endorsement of high visibility.  
 
Realizing that there is a remarkable difference between the prices that commercial publishers 
charge to libraries for economics journals and the prices charged by professional societies and 
university presses, Bergstrom (2001) assembled a database which contains the information on 
pages, prices, costs and citations for 297 English-language economics journals to examine the 
price differences and conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis. According to their owners, these 
journals are categorized into three groups: nonprofit publishers, Blackwell publishers (they are 
intermediate between nonprofit and commercial publishers) and commercial publishers. By 
analyzing the related data, the author concluded that while the nonprofit publishers are supplying 
most of the information used by economists, the commercial publishers consume more than 80 
percent of the library’s budget but supply only one third of all citations. 
 
Bergstrom (2001) mentioned that given that nonprofit and commercial journals use essentially the 
same technology for journal publication, the large difference in prices is not likely to be explained 
by differences in costs. To understand how a few commercial publishers could extract huge 
profits from the academic community despite the possibility of new entrants into the industry and 
competition from nonprofit journals, the author introduced the notion of a coordination game and 
showed that in such a game, the presence of potential competitors doesn’t necessarily prevent 
monopoly pricing. In order to prevent the academic community from being stuck in an 
equilibrium where it will continue to pay huge rents to commercial publishers, the author 
recommended the following strategies that might help convert the publishing activities to a new 
equilibrium which will better serve the academic community: expanding nonprofit journals, 
supporting new electronic journals and punishing overpriced journals. 
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Laband and Piette (1994b) investigate the changing industrial organization of the economics 
journal market over the period 1970-1990. Using the methodology employed by Liebowitz and 
Palmer (1984), they collected data on citations from1970 to 1990 for selected economics journals 
indexed by both the Index of Economics Articles (IEA) and the Social Science Citation Index 
(SSCI). They reported journals’ rankings in 1970, 1980, 1990 by unadjusted and impact-adjusted 
citations per article, and by unadjusted and impact-adjusted citations per typed character space. 
The results indicated that there was a steady decline in concentration of citations among the top 
economics journals over this period, which was due to existing journals and new entrants taking 
market share away from these long-established journals. Nonetheless, there was still an obvious 
inequality in the distribution of citations in economics journals and this inequality was more 
pronounced with respect to impact-adjusted citations than unadjusted citations. There had been a 
decline in the influence of most of the “second-tier” general-interest journals, which resulted from 
the increased influence of a number of field journals. The rapid entry and success of these field 
journals reflects the advantages of specialization because it is more cost-effective for scholars to 
browse through field journals which focus on topics they are interested in. The results also 
showed an increased impact of economics journals focused on mathematics and statistics and a 
decreased impact of economic history journals over the period 1970-1990. 
 
 
2.4 The prevailing single submission policy 
As review time and publication delay has increased in traditional journals, the circulation of pre-
print papers on the internet has played a major role in the communication of new scientific 
knowledge.  It seems that the role of the traditional journal has gradually been changed from the 
dissemination to the certification of scientific knowledge. If this is true, then the slowdown in the 
publishing process may be a good thing for the society because the cost of delaying a paper’s 
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publication has decreased since articles are often available on the internet prior to publication. 
Many scholars argue that it needs to establish a system to certify the quality of the large number 
of electronic articles. Riyanto and Yetkiner (2002) proposed a market-based mechanism to act as 
the screening device for electronic articles. This proposed mechanism is set up in an internet 
based scientific network and works by matching the demand for and supply of reviews in the 
network through a non-pecuniary incentive scheme.  Whether it is necessary to establish a 
certification system for electronic articles and how to build the system are the research topics of 
many academicians.  
 
Publication in scholarly journals is the primary route to promotion, tenure, salary increases and 
recognition. The slowdown in the publication process has caused a lot of criticism by 
academicians because it affects their welfare severely. Most of the scholarly journals except the 
law journals (Posner, 2004) prohibit multiple submissions. Szenberg (1994) argued that allowing 
multiple submissions can speed up the decision time involved in getting papers accepted for 
publication. He said that multiple submissions would reduce the time it takes to get a paper 
accepted for publication in two ways. First, it would make the editorial process more competitive 
and the journals have an incentive to do a quick refereeing job since they don’t want to lose the 
paper to their competitors. Second, it would also lead to quicker acceptances through elimination 
of “rejection waiting time” (having to wait for one rejection before being able to send a paper to 
another journal).  
 
Pressman (1994) argued that there are three main problems with the case for multiple submissions. 
First, a policy of multiple submissions would not substantially reduce the response time on 
individual papers and in fact, would likely increase it. Second, regardless of whether acceptances 
come more quickly or more slowly, a policy of multiple submissions would have negative 
consequences for the entire economics profession. Finally, even if the policy succeeded in 
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reducing response time, it would not help individual economists because it cannot increase the 
number of articles published in refereed journals since journals publish a fixed number of articles 
in one period. There are also many other arguments against multiple submissions, e.g., 1) it is a 
waste of time and money through duplication of effort on the part of referees and editorial staff; 2) 
it will induce low quality papers to be submitted to high quality journals and reduce the quality of 
published papers; 3) it will cause unnecessary complication of copyright privileges should a 
manuscript be accepted by two or more journals. 
 
 
 
2.5 Motivation of the model 
 
Besides research on the delayed publication process, there are also many investigations on the 
peer review system, the editor’s behavior and citations as a method of measuring papers’ quality, 
etc. There may be some relations between the current peer review system, the editor’s behavior 
and the delayed publication process. What kind of preference does the editor of the journal have? 
Will the editor choose papers according to the social norm or his own preference? These could be 
the directions for future research. The increasing publication delay in academic journals has 
caused a lot of criticism by academicians because publications are the primary route for them to 
get promotion, tenure, salary increase and recognition. The prevailing “single-submission” policy 
is blamed by some researchers as one of the causes of the slowdown. Although there is a debate 
on whether multiple submissions should be allowed, there are not formal models on this issue so 
far.   
 
In this dissertation, we develop a model to investigate an author’s submission strategy under two 
    
 
 
25 
 
different policy regimes: the single submission policy and the multiple-submission policy. 
Regarding the timely publication, some authors are less patient than others. E.g., assistant 
professors who are facing tenure decisions value timely publications more than those professors 
who already have tenure. We will discuss how an author’s optimal submission strategy changes 
as they become more or less patient. After deriving an author’s optimal submission strategy, we 
compare the per-period expected number of submissions and the average quality of published 
papers in the high and low quality journals under the two different policy regimes.  
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CHAPTER 3. SUBMISSION STRATEGY 
 
 
 
3.1  Submission strategy in one period horizon 
 
There are N  identical authors. Each author produces one paper per period with a random 
quality ( )q F q∼ and ( , )q∈ −∞ ∞ , where ( )f q is the probability density function of q and the 
production cost is zero. The realization of papers’ qualities are private information of their 
authors and they are uncorrelated. There are two journals which choose to publish the submitted 
papers. One journal is of “high quality” and the other one is of “low quality”. They are labeled 
with H  and L  respectively. An author gets a benefit HB  if  his paper is published in journal H  
and gets LB  if it is published in journal L . Here, we assume that 0H LB B> > . If  the paper is 
published in neither journal, he gets zero.  Editors of the two journals hire referees to review 
submitted papers and each paper is reviewed by one referee. After reviewing a paper, the referee 
will make an assessment of the paper’s quality. But this assessment is noisy, with the value 
s q α= + ,  where ( )Gα α∼  with mean zero and ( )g α is the . .p d f .The editor of journal j  sets a 
quality standard js   for his journal, where ,j H L= and 0H Ls s> > . This implies that a 
submitted paper will not be accepted for publication if the quality assessment by the referee is 
below the standard set by the submitted journal.  The two journals’ editors charge a fee HP  or LP  
for each submission, where 0H HB P> > , 0L LB P> > and H LP P≥ .   
 
 
3.1.1 Single submission  
 
In this section, we assume that there is only one period and the authors can submit their papers to 
only one journal. If a paper is rejected by the journal, the life ends for the paper. Given the 
editor’s choice of js , author i  decides whether and where to submit  his paper after  knowing  
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the paper’s quality iq , where ,j H L=  and 1,2,.......,i N= .  If he submits the paper to journal j , 
the probability of being accepted for publication is as follows: 
(1) ( ) Pr ( ) Pr ( )j i i j j j j iq ob q s ob s qπ α α= + > = > −  
where jα  represents the random error in the quality assessment of  author i ’s paper by the 
referee  of  journal j . Because ( )j Gα α∼ , (1) is equivalent to  
(2)  ( ) 1 ( )j i j iq G s qπ = − −  
Therefore, if author i  submits his paper to journal j , he gets an expected payoff      
(3)   ( ) ( )j i j j i jM q B q Pπ= − , and ,j H L=  
(4)   ( ) ( ) 0j i j j iM q B g s q′ = − >  
 
For an author who has a paper with qualityq , if ( ) [ ( ),0]H LM q Max M q> , he will submit his 
paper to the high quality journal; if  ( ) [ ( ),0]L HM q Max M q> , he will submit the paper to the low 
quality journal. In Chapter 3, we will investigate and discuss authors’ optimal submission 
strategies in the following four cases: 
1) Single submission and single period case 
2) Multiple-submission and single period case 
3) Single submission and multiple-period case 
4) Multiple-submission and multiple-period case 
 
To investigate an author’s submission strategy, we need the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1: H L H LB B P P> > ≥  
Assumption 2: ( ) ( )0,1j qπ ∈  for all ( ),q∈ −∞ ∞ ; ( )lim 0j
q
qπ
→−∞
= , ( )lim 1, ,j
q
q j L Hπ
→∞
= =  
Assumption 3: The density function of referee’s assessment error g is log-concave. 
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Define 
( )
( )
1 ( )
g x
h x
G x
≡
−
,  which is the failure rate or hazard function of  distributionG . Bagnoli 
and Bergstrom (2005) proved that if the density function is log-concave on ( , )a b , the hazard 
function is monotone increasing on ( , )a b . We assume that the density function g  is log-concave 
on ( , )−∞ +∞ ,2 then the hazard function is upward sloping or ( ) 0h x′ > . This implies that the 
distribution has positive duration dependence. Thus, for a paper with the quality difference level 
x ( ( )jx s q= − , which is the difference between a journal’s quality standard and the paper’s 
quality), the likelihood of failure (being rejected) at x , conditional upon duration (survival or 
being accepted) up to x , is increasing in x  . In other words, given a journal’s quality standard, as 
the paper’s quality rises or the quality difference x  declines, the likelihood of being rejected for 
this paper will decrease.   
 
Lemma 1: There exists a unique ( ). . 0j j jq s t M q  =  , ,j H L=  
 
Proof: 
Since ( ) ( )j j j jM q B q Pπ= − , with Assumption 1 and 2 we know that ( )lim 0j j
q
M q P
→−∞
= − <  and 
( )lim 0j j j
q
M q B P
→∞
= − > . Because ( )jM q  is continuous and ( ) ( ) 0j j jM q B g s q′ = − > , there 
must exist a unique ˆLq  and 0q , ( )ˆ. . 0L Ls t M q = and ( )0 0HM q =  
 
                                             
                                                                                 (Q.E.D) 
 
                                                 
2
 Some commonly-used distributions with log-concave density functions on ( , )−∞ +∞ are: normal 
distribution, logistic distribution, extreme value distribution, double exponential distribution, etc.  
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Lemma 2:  ( ), , , ,uH L L H H LB B s s P P∃   s.t. ( )ˆ , 0H L HM q B
>
<
=   as uH HB B
>
<
=  
Proof: 
Define ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆH H L H L H HJ B M q q B pπ= = −   where ( )ˆ 0L LM q =  
Then ( )0 0HJ P= − <  and ( )lim 0
H
H
B
J B
→∞
>  . Since ( )HJ B  is continuous and 
( ) ( )ˆ 0H H LJ B qπ′ = > , there must exist a unique uHB  s.t.  ( ) 0uHJ B =  or ( )ˆ , 0uH L HM q B = .  
Since ( ) 0HJ B′ > , as uH HB B> , we have ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, , 0uH L H H L HM q B M q B> = ; as uH HB B< , we 
have ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, , 0uH L H H L HM q B M q B< =  
                                                                                                                          (Q.E.D) 
 
 
Assumption 4: ( )( , uH L H L HB B P P B ∈ + −   
Define ( )0 Hq B   s.t. ( )0 , 0H HM q B = (from Lemma 1, we know that such a  0q exists for 
each HB ); Define ( )ˆH Hq B   s.t. ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ,H H H L HM q B M q=  
 
Lemma 3:  For ( )( , uH L H L HB B P P B ∈ + −  , we have  
1) 0 ˆLq q≥  where ( )0 0HM q = , ( )ˆ 0L LM q =  
2) ˆHq → ∞   as ( )H L H LB B P P
+→ + −  
 
Proof:  
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According to Lemma 2, we know ( )ˆ , 0uH L HM q B = . Since for each HB  there exists a unique 
( )0 Hq B   s.t. ( )0 , 0H HM q B = . Then by definition we know ( )0 ˆuH Lq B q= . From 
( )0 , 0H HM q B =  and implicit function theorem, we know that 
( )0
0
/
0
/
H H H
H
H H H
M B
dq dB
M q B g
π∂ ∂
= − = − <
∂ ∂
. 
Thus when uH HB B≤ , we have ( ) ( )0 0 ˆuH H Lq B q B q≥ = . 
Let ( ) ; 0H L H LB B P P ε ε= + − + ≥ .  Then 
( ) ( )( ){ }1H L H L H L H L HM M B P Pπ ε π π π− = − − + − − . Since L Hπ π>  for finite q  and 
H LP P≥ , ( )H LM M−  will be negative as 0ε
+→ unless 1Hπ →   which implies 1Lπ → and 
ˆHq → ∞ , thus ˆHq → ∞   as ( )H L H LB B P P
+→ + − . 
                                                                                                                        (Q.E.D) 
 
 
In “single submission and single period” case, an authors’ optimal submission strategy can be 
summarized in the following proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1:    
Given the journals’ quality standards Hs  and Ls , when Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied, there exist 
two quality thresholds  ˆHq  and  ˆLq   such that an author has the following submission strategy. 
1) If the paper’s quality satisfies ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ , there is no submission. 
2) If the paper’s quality satisfies ˆ ˆ[ , )L Hq q q∈ , it will be submitted to journal L . 
3) If the paper’s quality satisfies ˆ[ , )Hq q∈ +∞ , it will be submitted to journalH . 
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Where ( )ˆ 0L LM q =  and ( ) ( )ˆ ˆH H L HM q M q=  
 
Proof:  
We define a function ( ) ( ) ( )H LD q M q M q≡ − , which is the difference of the expected payoff 
between submitting to journal H and L  for an author having a paper with qualityq . We have:  
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H L H H L L H LD q M q M q q B q B P Pπ π= − = − − −  
(6)  ( ) ( ) ( )H H L LD q g s q B g s q B′ = − − −   
 
By Lemma 1, there exist unique points  0q  and ˆLq  such that 0( ) 0HM q = and ˆ( ) 0L LM q = . 
Under Assumption 4 or ( )( , uH L H L HB B P P B ∈ + −  , from Lemma 2 we know that 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0H L L LM q M q< = or ˆ( ) 0LD q < . Since by definition ˆHq  is such that ˆ( ) 0HD q = , from (5) we 
know that ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )H H H L H L H Lq B q B P Pπ π= + −  and have the following expression: 
(7)   
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ]
H H L H
H H H H L H L H H L L
H L
H H H H L H
H L L L
H H L
g s q g s q
D q g s q B g s q B B B
g s q g s q g s q
P P B
π π
π π
π
π π π
− −
′ = − − − = −
− − −
= − + −
 
 
Because ˆ ˆH H L Hs q s q− > − , then  by Assumption 3  we have 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ1 ( ) 1 ( )
H H H H L H L H
H H L H
H H H L H L
g s q g s q g s q g s q
h s q h s q
G s q G s qπ π
− − − −
− = = > − = =
− − − −
.  
Since H LP P≥ , from (7) we know that ˆ( ) 0HD q′ >  ˆ( ) 0HD q∀ = , thus there is a single crossing 
point ˆHq  between ( )HM q and ( )LM q .Because ( )jM q ( ,j H L= ) is monotonically increasing 
and 0 ˆLq q>  by Lemma 3, the curves of ( )HM q and ( )LM q can be shown in figure 2.  
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( )HM q
( )LM q
q
ˆHq
ˆLq 0q
 
Figure 2: Expected payoffs of submitting to journal H, L 
 
 
There exists exactly one point ˆHq  such that  ˆ( ) 0HD q =  or ˆ ˆ( ) ( )H H L HM q M q= . Since 0 ˆLq q>  
and ˆ( ) 0HD q′ > , we know  that ˆ ˆ( ) [1 ( )] 0H H H H H HM q B G s q P= − − − > and ˆ ˆH Lq q> . Thus, 
i) When ˆHq q> , ( ) ( )H LM q M q>  and ( ) 0HM q >  
ii) When ˆ ˆ[ , )L Hq q q∈ , ( ) ( )H LM q M q>  and ( ) 0LM q ≥  
iii) When ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ , ( ) 0HM q <  and ( ) 0LM q <  
                                                                                                                                     (Q.E.D) 
 
 
Therefore, the author who has a paper with the quality ˆHq q=  is indifferent between submitting 
his paper to the high or to the low quality journal.  For ˆ( , )Hq q∈ +∞ ,  we know that 
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( ) ( )H LM q M q> , so it’s more profitable to submit a paper with quality greater than ˆHq  to the 
high quality journal. Also, the expected payoff of submitting to the high quality journal is positive, 
thus the optimal strategy is to submit the paper to journalH . For ˆ ˆ[ , )L Hq q q∈ , we have 
( ) ( )H LM q M q<  and ( ) 0LM q ≥ , thus submitting  the paper to journal L  is the dominant 
strategy. For ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ , it’s that ( ) 0HM q <  and ( ) 0LM q < , so papers with qualities in this 
range will not be submitted to either journal.                     
                                                                                                                                                                                               
According to proposition 1, we know that the expected number of submissions to journal H and 
L  are ˆ[1 ( )]H HN N F q= − and ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )]L H LN N F q F q= −  respectively. In addition, we can derive 
the following corollary 1 and 2 from proposition 1. 
 
Corollary 1: ( )ˆ 0H Hdq dB < and ( )ˆ ˆuH H Lq B q=  
Proof: 
Since ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H H H L H L H LD q B q B q B P Pπ π= − − − = , from the implicit function theorem 
we know ( ) /ˆ
ˆ/
H
H H
H
D B
dq dB
D q
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
. Because ˆ( / ) ( ) 0H H HD B qπ∂ ∂ = > and ˆ( ) 0HD q′ > by the 
proof of proposition 1, we have ( )ˆ 0H Hdq dB < . Thus ˆHq  is monotonically decreasing in HB  
and there is a unique ˆHq  for each HB . 
When uH HB B= , by Lemma 3 we know that ( )0 ˆuH Lq B q=  and 0 ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0uH H L LM q B M q= = . Since 
ˆHq  is defined that H LM M=  and ˆHq  is unique for each HB ,  we have ( )ˆ ˆuH H Lq B q= . 
                                                                                                  
                         (Q.E.D) 
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Corollary 2:  The quality threshold for a paper to be submitted to the high quality journal 
increases more as the  high quality journal’s standard Hs  rises ( 
ˆ
1H
H
q
s
∂
>
∂
) and decreases as the 
low quality journal’s standard Ls  rises ( 
ˆ
0H
L
q
s
∂
<
∂
). The quality threshold for a paper to be 
submitted to either the low quality journal or no submission doesn’t depend on Hs  and increases 
as Ls rises. 
 
Proof: 
Since ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H H L H L H LD q q B q B P Pπ π= − − − = , we can derive: 
(8)  
ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
H H H H
H H H H L L H
q B g s q
s B g s q B g s q
∂ −
=
∂ − − −
 
(9)  
ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
H L L H
L L L H H H H
q B g s q
s B g s q B g s q
∂ −
=
∂ − − −
 
We know ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H H L L HD q B g s q B g s q′ = − − − > . Because ˆ( ) 0H Hg s q− >  and 
ˆ( ) 0L Hg s q− > ,  we have ˆ ˆ ˆ0 ( ) ( ) ( )H H H L L H H H HB g s q B g s q B g s q< − − − < − , thus 
ˆ ˆ( )
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
H H H H
H H H H L L H
q B g s q
s B g s q B g s q
∂ −
= >
∂ − − −
 and 
ˆ ˆ( )
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
H L L H
L L L H H H H
q B g s q
s B g s q B g s q
∂ −
= <
∂ − − −
.        
 
Since ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0L L L L L LM q q B Pπ= − = , we can derive: 
(10)   
ˆ
0L
H
q
s
∂
=
∂
 
(11)   
ˆ
0L
L
q
s
∂
>
∂
     
 
(Q.E.D) 
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As journalH ’s quality standard rises, the quality threshold of submitting a paper to journal 
H also increases, thus the marginal author who is originally indifferent between submitting 
his paper to either journal will switch to journal L  and the expected submissions to journal 
H will decrease. Also, as journal L ’s quality standard rises, the quality threshold for a paper 
to be submitted to journal H  will decrease, thus this marginal author will switch to journal 
H and H
N
 increases. Together with (11) and (12), we know as H
s
 increases, the expected 
submissions to journal L  increase and as L
s
 increases, the expected submissions to journal 
L  decrease.  
 
                                                                        
3.1.2   Multiple submissions  
Now we allow an author to submit his paper to the two journals simultaneously but continue to 
assume there is only one period. There are four possibilities when the paper is submitted to both 
journals: 1) the paper is accepted by both journals; 2) it is accepted by journal H but rejected by 
journal L ; 3) it is accepted by journal L  but rejected by journalH ; 4) it is rejected by both 
journals. If the paper is accepted by both journals, the author can only choose one journal to 
publish his paper, and he will always choose the high quality journal since he gets a higher 
publication benefits from journalH , i.e., H LB B> . Thus, if an author submits his paper to both 
journals, his expected payoff is as follows: 
(12)  , ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ( )H L H H H L L H LM q q B q q B P Pπ π π= + − − +  
 
This expected payoff is an increasing function of the paper’s quality since  
(13)  
, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( )
( ) [1 ( )] ( )
( ){ [1 ( )]} ( )( ) 0
H L H H L L H L L H
H H L L H
H H L L H H L
M q B g s q B g s q G s q B G s q g s q
B g s q B G s q g s q
g s q B B G s q g s q B B
′ = − + − − − − − −
                > − − − − −
                = − − − − > − − >
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Assumption 5:  4L LB P>  
Define ,( ) ( ) ( )H H LD q M q M q≡ −ɶ , which is the difference in the expected payoff between 
submitting to only journal H and submitting to both journals; Define ( ) ( )
( )ˆH HH q q B
K B D q
=
= ɶ  
 
Lemma 4: If 4L LB P> , there exist ,q q′ ′′   s.t. ( ) 0D q >ɶ  for ( ) ( ), ,q q q′ ′′∈ −∞ ∪ ∞  and ( ) 0D q <ɶ  
for ( ),q q q′ ′′∈  
 
Proof: 
(14)   ,( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( )H H L L H L LD q M q M q P q q Bπ π= − = − −ɶ  
Under Assumption 2, we know that ( )lim 0L
q
D q P
→−∞
= >ɶ  and ( )lim 0L
q
D q P
→+∞
= >ɶ  
Since ( )L L
d
g s q
dq
π
= −  and ( )
2
2
L
L
d
g s q
dq
π
′= − − , we know that: 
(15)   
( ) ( ){ }1H L H L L
dD q
B
dq
π π π π′ ′= − −
ɶ
 
(16)   
( ) ( ){ }
2
2
2 1H L H L H L L
d D q
B
dq
π π π π π π′′ ′′ ′′= + − −
ɶ
 
 
Evaluating 
( )2
2
d D q
dq
ɶ
 at 
( )
0
dD q
dq
=
ɶ
  yields: 
 
(17)
( )
( )
2
2
0
2 2H L L H LH L H L L H L L H L
H LLdD dq
d D q
B B
dq
π π π π π
π π π π π π π π
π ππ=
   ′ ′′ ′′ ′′    ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′= − + + = + −    ′ ′′       ɶ
ɶ
 
 
 
Define ( ) ( )lny gα α≡    , then ( )
( )
( )
g
y
g
α
α
α
′
′ = . By Assumption 3 or the log-concavity of the 
density function g , we know that ( ) 0y α′′ ≤  or ( )
( )
g
g
α
α
′
 is decreasing (non-increasing) in α . 
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Then
( )
( )
( )
( )
0
L HH L
H L L H
g s q g s q
g s q g s q
π π
π π
′ ′− −′′ ′′ 
− = − > ′ ′ − − 
 since H Ls q s q− > − . Because , 0H Lπ π ′′ >  and 
0Lπ > , we know that  
( )
( )
2
2
0
0
dD dq
d D q
dq
=
>
ɶ
ɶ
.   
 
 
 
Combined with ( )lim 0L
q
D q P
→−∞
= >ɶ  and ( )lim 0L
q
D q P
→+∞
= >ɶ , we know  that there are either zero 
or two values of q  s.t. ( ) 0D q =ɶ . For LP  sufficiently large (e.g. L LP B> ), 
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) 0L H L L L LD q P q q B P Bπ π= − − > − >ɶ andDɶ  will be positive everywhere.  On the other 
hand, for 
4
L
L
B
P <  there must be a domain in which 0D <ɶ . Because at q
⌢ ( ). . ( ) 1 2Ls t qπ =
⌢
, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 2 1 ( ) ( ) 1 4 0
4
L
H L H L L
B
q q q q D q Pπ π π π< = → − > → < − <⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ⌢ɶ . Since 
( ) ( ) 0D D−∞ = ∞ >ɶ ɶ  and ( ) 0D q <⌢ɶ , Dɶ  must achieve a (local) minimum somewhere in 
( ),q∈ −∞ ∞ .   
 
The beginning analysis in this proof shows that whenever  0
dD
dq
=
ɶ
 , 
2
2
0
d D
dq
>
ɶ
, which implies that 
given continuity of 
dD
dq
ɶ
, there can be only one extreme point, and that extreme point is a 
minimum.  Therefore, ( )D qɶ  can cross the zero axis at most twice.  And under the 
assumption
4
L
L
B
P < , there will be two roots q′ and q′′ to the equation ( ) 0D q =ɶ . We know that 
( ) 0D q >ɶ  for ( ) ( ), ,q q q′ ′′∈ −∞ ∪ ∞  and ( ) 0D q <ɶ  for ( ),q q q′ ′′∈ . 
                                                                          
(Q.E.D) 
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Lemma 5: There exist ( )1 ,H L H L HB B P P B∈ + − ɶ  and ( )2 , uH H HB B B∈ ɶ , where  ( ) 1 2L HBπ =ɶ , s.t. 
( )ˆ 0HD q <ɶ  for ( )1 2,H H HB B B∈  
 
Proof: 
By definition, ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,H H H H H H H HL H H HK B q B M B q B M B q B≡ − , 
then ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, [1 ( )] ( )H H H H L H H H L H H LK B q B D q P q B q B Bπ π= = − −ɶ .  
By Corollary 1 we know that ( )ˆ 0H Hdq dB < , thus 
( )( )ˆ ˆ
0
ˆ
L H H L H
H H H
d q B dq
dB q dB
π π  ∂
= <  
∂  
. 
If 4L LB P> , then ( )
1
ˆ
4
L
L L
L
P
q
B
π = < . Because ( )( )
( )
ˆlim 1
H L H L
L H H
B B P P
q Bπ
+→ + −
=  since ˆHq → ∞  and 
( )( ) ( )ˆlim 1 4
u
H H
L
L H H
B B
L
P
q B
B
π
→
= <   since ˆ ˆH Lq q→ , we know ( )( )ˆL H Hq Bπ  is a monotonically 
decreasing function of HB  with upper bound of one, and lower bound less than ( )1 4 .  Thus, 
there must exist a unique ( )( , uH L H L HB B P P B ∈ + − ɶ  s.t. ( ) 1 2L HBπ =ɶ . 
 
Further, 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 0
4
L
H H L H H L H L L L H L H L L
B
K q B P q q B P q q B Pπ π π π   = − − < − − < − <   
ɶ
 
By Lemma 3 we know that ˆHq → ∞  as ( )H L H LB B P P
+→ + − , thus 
( )( )
( )
ˆlim 0
H L H L
H H L
B B P P
K q B P
+→ + −
= >  since ( )ˆ 1H Hqπ → . By Corollary 1 we know that 
ˆ ˆ( )uH H Lq B q= , thus 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlim 1 0
u
H H
H H L H L L L L L L L L L L H L L
B B
K q B P q q B P q B q q Bπ π π π π
→
 = − − = − + > 
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since ( )( )ˆ 0L L L LP q Bπ− = . From previous analysis in Lemma 4, we know that 
( )
( )
2
2
0
0
dD dq
d D q
dq
=
>
ɶ
ɶ
. Since ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, [1 ( )] ( )H H H H L H H H L H H LK B q B D q P q B q B Bπ π= = − −ɶ , 
using the same approach we will have 
( )
2
2
ˆ 0
0
ˆ
H
H dK dq
d K
dq
=
> .  Thus, K has at most one extreme 
point, which is the minimum, and K  can cross the zero axis at most twice.  For the 
assumption
4
L
L
B
P < , there are two roots to the equation ( )( )ˆ 0H HK q B = . By Corollary 1 we 
know that ( )ˆH Hq B  is a monotonically decreasing function of HB . Thus, there exist exactly two 
points 1HB  and
2
HB  , s.t. ( )( )1ˆ 0H HK q B =  and ( )( )2ˆ 0H HK q B = , 
where ( ) ( )1 2, , , UH L H L H H H HB B P P B B B B∈ + − ∈ɶ ɶ . Therefore, when ( )1 2,H H HB B B∈ , we 
have ( ) 0HK B <  or ( )ˆ 0HD q <ɶ . 
                                                                                                                                                 (Q.E.D) 
 
From Lemma 4 and 5, we know that there exist a domain for HB  such that ( )ˆ ( ) 0H HD q B <ɶ  or 
( ) ( ),ˆ ˆH H H L HM q M q< . Since ( ) ( )ˆ ˆH H L HM q M q= at ˆHq , by continuity there will be a domain 
for paper’s quality such that { } ,, ,L H HL H LMax M M M M= .  
 
Assumption 6: 2H LB B≥      
 
 
The submission strategy for an author having a paper with quality q  depends on the relative 
magnitude of ( )HM q , ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q .  An author’s optimal submission strategy in 
“multiple-submission and single period” case can be summarized in the following proposition 2. 
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Proposition 2:    
Given Hs  and Ls ,  when Assumptions 1- 6 hold, there exist quality thresholds 2q , 3q , ˆHq and  
ˆLq  such that an author has the following submission strategy. 
1) If the paper’s quality satisfies 2[ , )q q∈ +∞ , submit it to journal H only. 
2) If the paper’s quality satisfies 3 2[ , )q q q∈ , submit it to journal H and L simultaneously. 
3) If the paper’s quality satisfies 3ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈ , submit it to journal L only. 
4) If the paper’s quality satisfies ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ , no submission. 
Where 2 , 2( ) ( )H H LM q M q= , , 3 3( ) ( )H L LM q M q= , ˆ ˆ( ) ( )H H L HM q M q=  and ˆ( ) 0L LM q = . 
 
Proof:  
By definition we have ,( ) ( ) ( )H H LD q M q M q≡ −ɶ  and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,H H H H H H H HL H H HK B q B M B q B M B q B≡ − . Under Assumption 5 or 4L LB P> , 
according to Lemma 5 we know that there exist 1HB  and
2
HB  , s.t. 
( )( )1ˆ 0H HK q B = , ( )( )2ˆ 0H HK q B =  and ( )ˆ ( ) 0H HK q B < for ( )1 2,H H HB B B∈ , 
where ( ) ( )1 2, , , UH L H L H H H HB B P P B B B B∈ + − ∈ɶ ɶ  and ( ) 1 2L HBπ =ɶ .Define ( )12 ˆH Hq q B≡ , then 
2 ˆ ( )H Hq q B>  for ( )1 2,H H HB B B∈ since ( )ˆ 0H Hdq dB < .  
 
From the proof of Lemma 4, we know that ( )D qɶ  can cross the zero axis at most twice, thus we 
have ( ) 0D q >ɶ  when 2( , )q q∈ +∞  and ( ) 0D q ≤ɶ  when 2ˆ( , ]Hq q q∈ .So, for 
2( , )q q∈ +∞ { }, ,L H HL HMax M M M M=  and submitting to the high quality journal is the 
dominant strategy; for 2ˆ( , ]Hq q q∈  { } ,, ,L H HL H LMax M M M M= and submitting to both journals 
is the dominant strategy. 
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Define ,
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )H L LD q M q M q≡ − , which is the difference of the expected payoff between 
submitting to both journals and only journal L  for an author having a paper with quality q . 
Since ( )H H H HM q B Pπ= −  , ( )L L L LM q B Pπ= − and 
, ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ( )H L H H H L L H LM q q B q q B P Pπ π π= + − − + , we have: 
(18)  ˆ ( ) ( )H H L L HD q B B Pπ π= − −  
(19)  ˆ ( ) H H H L L H L LD q B B Bπ π π π π′ ′ ′ ′= − −  
 
When Assumption 3 holds, we know that 
( ) ( )
1 ( ) 1 ( )
H L
H L
g s q g s q
G s q G s q
− −
>
− − − −
 since log-concave density 
functions have the monotone increasing hazard functions
3
. Then we have 
(20)  ( )[1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )]H L L Hg s q G s q g s q G s q− − − > − − −  or H L H Lπ π π π′ ′>  
From (19), we know  
(21) ˆ ( ) 2 ( 2 ) ( 2 )H H H L L H H L L H H LD q B B B B B Bπ π π π π π′ ′ ′ ′ ′> − = − ≥ −  
 
When Assumption 6 holds or 2H LB B≥ , we have ˆ ( ) 0D q′ >  or the difference between , ( )H LM q  
and ( )LM q  is monotonically increasing in q . When 0q q≤ ,  since ( ) ( ) 0H H H HM q q B Pπ= − ≤  
we know that: 
(22)  , ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )H L H H H H L L L H L L L L L L LM q B P B P B P B P M qπ π π π π π= − + − − ≤ − − < − =  
So , 0 0( ) ( )H L LM q M q< or 0ˆ ( ) 0D q < .  
 
                                                 
3
 The monotone increasing hazard rate property discussed here is similar as the strict monotone likelihood 
ratio property (MLRP) discussed in the paper “The Decentralized College Admissions Problem with 
Frictions” authored by Hector Chade, Gregory Lewis and Lones Smith. The strict MLRP holds if the 
density function g is log-concave. 
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When 4L LB P> , from Lemma 4 we know that there exists ( )1 ,H L H L HB B P P B∈ + − ɶ  and 
( )2 , UH H HB B B∈ ɶ , where  ( ) 1 2L HBπ =ɶ ,s.t. ( ) 0HK B <   for ( )1 2,H H HB B B∈ . So 
if ( )1 2,H H HB B B∈ , we have ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ 0H H H HL HK B M q M q= − <  thus 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆL H H H HL HM q M q M q= <  or ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0H HL H L HD q M q M q= − >  
 
Since 0
ˆ ( ) 0D q < , ˆ ˆ( ) 0HD q > and ˆ ( ) 0D q′ >  , there must exist exactly one point 3 0 ˆ( , )Hq q q∈ such 
that , 3 3( ) ( )H L LM q M q= , in other words , ( )H LM q  crosses ( )LM q  only once at 3q . From 
ˆ ( ) 0D q′ >  and 3ˆ ( ) 0D q = , we know that: 
i) When 3q q> ,  , ( ) ( )H L LM q M q>  
ii) When 3q q≤ , , ( ) ( )H L LM q M q≤  
 
When 3 ˆ( , ]Hq q q∈ , we know that , ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H L L HM q M q M q> ≥ > , so 
{ } ,, , 0L H HL H LMax M M M M= >  and submitting the paper to both journals is the dominant 
strategy. When 3ˆ( , ]Lq q q∈ , we have , ( ) ( )H L LM q M q≤  and ( ) ( )H LM q M q< since 3 ˆHq q<  , 
thus { } ˆ, , ( ) 0L H HL L L LMax M M M M M q= > =  and submitting the paper to only journal L is the 
dominant strategy. When ˆLq q≤ , { }, , 0L H HL LMax M M M M= < , the paper will not be 
submitted.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             (Q.E.D) 
 
 
 
    
 
 
43 
 
Therefore,  
i) When  2[ , )q q∈ +∞ , we know that ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q>  and ( ) ( )H LM q M q> since 
2 ˆHq q> , thus an author having a paper with quality no less than 2q  will choose to 
submit his paper to only the high quality journal. 
 
ii) When 3 2[ , )q q q∈ , we know , ( ) ( )H L LM q M q≥  and , ( ) ( )H L HM q M q> .Thus, 
submitting the paper to both journals simultaneously is the dominant strategy for an 
author having a paper with quality in this range. 
 
iii) When 3ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈ , we have , ( ) ( )H L LM q M q<  and ( ) ( )H LM q M q< since 
3 ˆHq q< ( ( ) ( )H LM q M q<  when ˆHq q< according to proposition 1). Also, we 
know ( ) 0LM q ≥ when ˆLq q≥ from proposition 1 , so submitting the paper to journal 
L  is the dominant strategy. 
 
iv) When ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ ,  we know that , ( ) ( ) 0H L LM q M q< <  and ( ) ( ) 0H LM q M q< < , 
thus the paper will never be submitted to either journal.     
 
The curves of ( )HM q , ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q are illustrated  in figure 3 
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( )HM q
( )LM q
q
ˆHqˆLq 0
q
2q
, ( )H LM q
3q
Figure 3: Expected payoffs of submitting to journal H, L and both 
 
In the case of “single submission” only the papers with quality ˆ[ , )Hq q∈ +∞  will be submitted to 
the high quality journal, but if multiple submissions were allowed, the submissions to journal H  
also include the papers with quality 3 ˆ[ , )Hq q q∈ . In addition, the submissions to journal L  will 
include all papers with quality 2ˆ[ , )Hq q q∈ , as compared to papers with quality ˆ ˆ[ , )L Hq q q∈  in 
the single submission case. Allowing multiple submissions is like giving the authors an option 
and whether they choose to exercise the option or not depends on the realization of their paper’s 
quality. According to the equilibrium submission strategy analyzed above, we know that if an 
author has a paper with quality below but close to the high quality threshold ˆHq  (e.g., 
3 ˆ[ , )Hq q q∈  ), he will choose to exercise this option and to simultaneously submit his paper to 
both journals. Similarly, if an author has a paper with quality above but close to ˆHq  (e.g., 
2ˆ[ , )Hq q q∈ ), he will choose multiple submission in case his paper is rejected by the high quality 
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journal  but still has a chance of being accepted by journal L . But if the paper’s quality is already 
relatively high ( 2q q> ) or relatively low ( 3q q< ), the author will not choose multiple 
submissions. Therefore, in this case the expected number of submissions to both the high and low 
quality journals will increase compared with “single submission” and the expected number of 
non-submitted papers doesn’t change.  
 
 
3.2 Submission strategy in multi-period horizon 
 
 
So far, we have investigated the authors’ submission strategies in the situation of both single and 
multiple submissions. But the analysis has been in a one period framework, if a paper gets 
rejected the life of the paper ends. In reality, a rejected paper may be resubmitted by its author in 
the next period. In this section, we will investigate the so called “sequential submission” in an 
infinite time horizon and discuss the authors’ optimal submission strategy in both the case of 
single and multiple submissions. We assume that there are an infinite number of periods and each 
author produces one paper per period. Suppose each period the author can submit his new paper 
to only one journal, and if the paper is rejected he can resubmit it to the other journal in the 
following period, but if it is rejected again he cannot submit this paper any more in the future. 
Thus every paper can be submitted at most twice since there are only two journals. In other words, 
if a paper is rejected twice the life ends for the paper. An author may face two decisions in each 
period: 1) whether and where to submit his new paper; 2) if he has a paper rejected in last period, 
whether to resubmit this old paper. So the submitted papers in each period may include newly 
produced ones and the old ones which were rejected in last period.  
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3.2.1 Single submission  
 
Suppose each period an author can submit his paper to only one journal. When the paper is 
rejected he can resubmit it in the following period, but the resubmitted journal can not be the 
same one as in the previous period. Thus, every paper can be submitted at most twice since there 
are only two journals. In other words, if a paper is rejected twice, the life ends for this paper. An 
author who has a new paper faces two decisions: 1) whether and where to submit the paper in the 
current period; 2) if the paper was rejected, whether to resubmit it in next period. The decision 
tree is shown in figure 4, where period 1,2t =  represents the first and second period; actions 
H , L  and N  represent submitting to high quality journal,  low quality journal and no submission; 
states A , R  represent being “accepted” or “ rejected” respectively.  
1
RA
H L
AR
HL N N
22
N
 
Figure 4: “Decision tree” of single submission 
 
For a paper with quality q , in period 2t =  the expected payoff of submitting the paper to journal 
H or L  is as follows: 
 (23)   ( ) ( )H H H HM q q B Pπ= −  
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 (24)   ( ) ( )L L L LM q q B Pπ= −  
 
According to (4), we know that ( )HM q  and ( )LM q  are monotonically increasing in q .
 
From the 
analysis in section 3, we know the two curves of ( )HM q  and ( )LM q can be shown in figure 5, 
and 0( ) 0HM q = , ˆ( ) 0L LM q = . Thus, in period 2t =  if a paper with quality 0q q> is submitted to 
the high quality journal, the author gets a positive expected payoff .Also, if a paper with quality 
ˆLq q>  is submitted to the low quality journal, the author gets a positive expected payoff.  
According to proposition 1, we also know that ( ) ( )H LM q M q> when ˆHq q>  and vice versa.  
( )HM q
( )LM q
q
ˆHq
ˆ Lq 0q
1q
 
Figure 5: Expected payoffs of submitting to journal H, L in period 2 
 
Suppose every author has the same discount factor [0,1]δ ∈ . In period 1t = , the expected payoff 
of submitting the paper to journal H or L  is as follows: 
(25)   
1 ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] { ( ),0}
( ) [1 ( )] { ( ),0}
H H H H H L
H H L
M q q B P q Max M q
M q q Max M q
π δ π
δ π
= − + −
              = + −
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(26)     
1 ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] { ( ),0}
( ) [1 ( )] { ( ),0}
L L L L L H
L L H
M q q B P q Max M q
M q q Max M q
π δ π
δ π
= − + −
              = + −
 
 
Therefore, for an author having a paper with quality q , where to submit his paper in the first 
period depends on the relative magnitude of 1 ( )HM q and 1 ( )LM q or the sign of 
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )H LD q M q M q≡ − . The author’s optimal submission strategy in “single submission and 
multiple-period” case is summarized in the following proposition 3 and illustrated in table 2. 
 
Proposition 3:   
Given Hs  and Ls , when Assumptions 1- 6 hold, there exist quality thresholds 1q , 0q and ˆLq  
such that an author has the following submission strategy. 
1) When 1[ , )q q∈ +∞ , submit it to journal H in first period; if rejected, then resubmit it to 
journal L in second period; 
2) When 0 1[ , )q q q∈ , submit it to journal L  in first period; if rejected, then resubmit it to 
journal H in second period; 
3) When 0ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈ , submit it to journal L  in first period; if rejected, no resubmission. 
4) When ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ , never submit it to either journal. 
 
Where 1 1 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q= , 0( ) 0HM q = , ˆ( ) 0L LM q =  and ˆ ˆ( ) ( )H H L HM q M q=  
 
Proof: 
When ˆ[ , )Hq q∈ +∞ ,   from proposition 1 we know that ( ) ( ) 0H LM q M q≥ > , so 
{ ( ),0} ( )L LMax M q M q= and { ( ),0} ( )H HMax M q M q= . We define:  
(27) 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )H LD q M q M q≡ − .  
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Thus, in period 1t =  the difference in the expected payoff between submitting to journal H and 
L  is as follows: 
(28) 1 1( ) ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( )H L L H H LM q M q q M q q M qδ π δ π− = − − − − −  
 
Since  0 ( ) ( ) 1H Lq qπ π≤ < ≤
4
 and (0,1]δ ∈ , then 1 [1 ( )] 1 [1 ( )] 0L Hq qδ π δ π− − > − − ≥ . This 
implies that if ( ) ( ) 0H LM q M q≥ > , then 1 1( ) ( ) 0H LM q M q− > . Thus the optimal strategy for an 
author having a paper with quality ˆ[ , )Hq q∈ +∞   is that: 
i ) To submit the paper to the high quality journal in first period.  
ii)  If it is rejected, then resubmit it to the low quality journal in second period since ( ) 0LM q > . 
 
When 0 ˆ[ , )Hq q q∈ , we know ( ) ( ) 0L HM q M q> ≥ , so { ( ),0} ( )L LMax M q M q= and 
{ ( ),0} ( )H HMax M q M q= . From the previous analysis we 
know 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H L HD q M q M q= − > . At 0q q= , we have 0( ) 0HM q = and 0( ) 0LM q > , so 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) 0H L H LD q M q M q q M qδ π= − = − − − < .   
Since 1 ˆ( ) 0HD q > and 1 0( ) 0D q < , by continuity there exists ( ) ( )1 0 1 1ˆ, . . 0Hq q q s t D q∈ = . So 
that ( )1 0D q =  has at least one root. We know that  
(29) ( ) { }1 1 [1 ( )] {1 [1 ( )]}L H H H L L H L L HD q q B q B M Mδ π π δ π π δ π δ π′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − − − − + −  
 
Evaluating at ( )1 0D q = , we have  
                                                 
4
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )H L H H L LG s q G s q q G s q q G s qπ π− > − ⇒ = − − < = − −  
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(30)   
( ) { }
{ }
( ) ( )
1 1 [1 ( )] {1 [1 ( )]}
1 [1 ( )] {1 [1 ( )]}
L H H H L L L H H L
H L
L H H H L L
H L
L H
L H H L
L H
D q q B q B M M
q B q B
M M
δ π π δ π π δπ δπ
π π
δ π π δ π π
π π
π π
δ π δ π
π π
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − − − − + −
′ ′   
= − − − − −   
   
′ ′   
+ −   
   
 
 
Given ( ) , ,i i i iB M P i L Hπ = + =  and  {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( )L H H Lq M q q M qδ π δ π− − = − −  or  
1 [1 ( )]
1 [1 ( )]
H H
L L
M q
M q
δ π
δ π
− −
=
− −
 at ( )1 0D q = , rewrite (30) as: 
 
(31) 
( ) { } ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 [1 ( )]
1 [1 ( )
1 [1 ( )
H L H
L H H L L
H L L
H L L
H H L H
H H L
M
D q q M P M P
M
q
M M
q
π π
δ π
π π
π δ π π
δ π π
π δ π π
 ′ ′    
′ = − − + − +           
 ′ ′     − −
− −      
− −       
 
 
Simplifying (31), we have the following expression: 
(32)  
( ) { }
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
1 1 [1 ( )]
1 [1 ( )] 1
1 [1 ( )]
1 [1 ( )] 1
1 [1 ( )]
H H L
L H L
H L L
H H
H L
H H
L L
H L
L L
M
D q q P P
M
M q
q
M q
q
π π
δ π
π π
π δπ
δ π
π δ π
π δπ
δ π
π δ π
 ′ ′      ′ = − − −      
       
 ′   
               + − − −    
− −    
 ′   
               − − − −  
− −   
{ } ( ) { }
{ }
1 [1 ( )]
1 [1 ( )] 1
1 [1 ( )]
LH H L H L
L H L H
H L L H H L
qM
q P P M
M q
δ ππ π π π
δ π δ
π π π δ π π

    − −′ ′ ′ ′            
= − − − + − −              
− −                
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Since ( ) ( )H Lq qπ π<  and 0 1δ< ≤ , we have
1 [1 ( )]
1
1 [1 ( )]
H H
L L
M q
M q
δ π
δ π
− −
= <
− −
 at ( )1 0D q = . By 
Assumption 1 we have H LP P≥  and by Assumption 3 we know that  
( )
( )
x
x
π
π
′
 is increasing in x 
(the hazard rate is increasing in x  if the density function is log-concave). Thus, at ( )1 0D q = , 
0H H L H LH L
H L L H L
M
P P
M
π π π π
π π π π
′ ′ ′ ′     
− > − >     
     
 and the first term in (32) is positive. Also, 
( )1 0H L L H L
H H L H L
M
M
π π π π
δ
π π π π
′ ′ ′ ′    
− − > − >    
    
 and the second term in (32) is positive. Hence, 
( )1 0D q′ >  at ( )1 0D q = . Since 1 0( ) 0D q <  and 1 ˆ( ) 0HD q > , there must exist a unique point 
1 0 ˆ( , )Hq q q∈  ( )1 1. . 0s t D q =  
 
Thus, when 1 ˆ[ , )Hq q q∈  we have 1( ) 0D q >  and ( ) 0LM q > , and the optimal submission strategy 
for the author is to submit the paper to the high quality journal in first period and resubmit it to 
the low quality journal in second period .When 0 1[ , )q q q∈  we have 1( ) 0D q < and ( ) 0HM q > , so 
the optimal submission strategy for the author is: 
i )  To submit the paper to the low quality journal in first period. 
ii)  If it is rejected, then resubmit it to the high quality journal in second period. 
 
When 0ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈ ,  ( ) 0 ( )L HM q M q≥ > , so { ( ),0} ( )L LMax M q M q= and { ( ),0} 0HMax M q = . 
Thus, we have: 
(33)  1 1( ) ( ) ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) 0H L H H LM q M q M q q M qδ π− = − − − <  
 
So the optimal strategy for an author having a paper with quality 0ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈   is: 
i )  To submit the paper to the low quality journal in first period. 
    
 
 
52 
 
ii)  If it is rejected, do not submit to the high quality journal in second period. 
When ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞ ,  we have ( ) 0LM q <  and ( ) 0HM q < .Thus, the optimal strategy for an 
author having a paper with quality ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞   is that they never submit the paper to either 
journal. Thus, the optimal submission strategy is as stated in the proposition.                  
 
                                                                                                                                 (Q.E.D)                                      
      
 
From proposition 3, we can derive the following Corollary 3. 
Corollary 3:  The quality threshold for a paper to be submitted to the high quality journal in the 
first period decreases as the author’s discount factor increases. 
 
Proof: 
We know 1q  is determined by 1 1( , ) 0D q δ =  or  
(34)   1 1 1 1{1 [1 ( )]} ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) 0L H H Lq M q q M qδ π δ π− − − − − = ,   1 0 ˆ[ , ]Hq q q∈  
According to the implicit function theorem: 
(35) 
1
1 1
1
/
|
( / ) q q
dq D
d D q
δ
δ =
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
  
 Then 
1
1
1 1 1 1| ( )[1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )] 0q q L H H L
D
M q q M q qπ π
δ =
∂
= − − − >
∂
 since  1 10 1 ( ) 1 ( )L Hq qπ π< − < −  
and 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q≤  when 1 0 ˆ[ , ]Hq q q∈ . According to proposition 3, we know that 1( )D q is 
monotonically increasing at 1q . Thus 
1
1 | 0
q q
D
q =
∂
>
∂
, and we have 1 0
dq
dδ
< .                                                                              
                                                                                                                                            (Q.E.D)  
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Table 2: Multi-period submission strategy in “single submission”
1t = 2t =
1[ , )q q∈ +∞
0 1[ , )q q q∈
0ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈
ˆ( , )Lq q∈ −∞
H L
HL
L N
N N
if
if
rejected
rejected
if rejected
                                                                                                                                                                        
In every period an author may face two decisions: 1) whether and where to submit his new paper;   
2) if he had a paper rejected in the last period, whether to resubmit this old paper. So the 
submitted papers in each period may include newly produced ones and the old ones which were 
rejected in the last period. According to table 2, we know that the per-period expected number of 
submissions to journal H is as follows:  
 
(36)     
1
0
1
0
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0
1
[1 ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ( | )
( ) ( )
[1 ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
( ) ( )
[1 ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
H L
q
L
q
q
L
q
N N F q N F q F q Prob q s q q q
f q G s q dq
N F q N F q F q
F q F q
N F q N f q G s q dq
α= − + − + < ≤ <
−
       = − + −
−
       = − + −
∫
∫
 
  
The average quality of the papers accepted for publication in journal H is: 
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(37)  
1
1 0
1
1 0
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
q
H L H
q q
H q
H L H
q q
qf q G s q dq qf q G s q G s q dq
Q
f q G s q dq f q G s q G s q dq
+∞
+∞
− − + − − −
=
− − + − − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
 
Similarly, the expected per-period number of submissions to journal L  is as follows: 
(38)       1
1
1 1 1
1 1
1
1
ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [1 ( )] ( | )
( ) ( )
ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [1 ( )]
1 ( )
ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
L L H
H
q
L
L H
q
N N F q F q N F q Prob q s q q
f q G s q dq
N F q F q N F q
F q
N F q F q N f q G s q dq
α
+∞
+∞
= − + − + < ≥
−
       = − + −
−
       = − + −
∫
∫
 
 
The average quality of the papers accepted for publication in journal L  is: 
(39)     
1
1
1
1
ˆ
ˆ
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
L
L
q
L H L
q q
L q
L H L
q q
qf q G s q dq qf q G s q G s q dq
Q
f q G s q dq f q G s q G s q dq
+∞
+∞
− − + − − −
=
− − + − − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
 
 
Compared to the “one period case” analyzed in section 3, the expected per-period number of 
submissions to journal H increases and per period submissions to L  is ambiguous. But for newly 
produced papers, it’s straightforward to see from figure 5 that there are more submissions to 
journal H and fewer submissions to journal L  since 1 0 ˆ( , ]Hq q q∈ . Intuitively, if there is an 
opportunity of resubmission in the second period, some authors who choose journal L  in the 
“one period case” will submit their papers to journal H in the first period and if rejected, can still 
get a positive expected payoff in the second period as long as the discount factor is greater than 
zero.  
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ˆLq
0q
1 ( )q δ
ˆHq
q
H L→
L H→
L N→
N
δ0
q
⌢
1
Figure 6: Submission strategy in “single submission” as δ changes 
 
Figure 6 illustrates how the quality thresholds which determine an author’s optimal submission 
strategy change as the discount factor changes.  From Corollary 3, we know that 1q  increases as 
δ  declines, which implies that given the paper’s quality, as the author becomes less patient he 
will switch his submission strategy from the H L→  area to the L H→ area as shown in figure 5. 
For example, suppose there are two professors, one of them who has already received tenure and 
the other one who is an assistant professor. Assuming that their papers have the same quality 
level q
⌢
 which is shown in figure 6, it’s more likely that the tenured professor will submit his 
paper to the high quality journal in the first period because he is more patient and cares more 
about the quality of the journal where his paper is going to be published. On the contrary, the 
assistant professor is more likely to submit his paper to the low quality journal in the first period 
so as to get a higher probability of being accepted for publication today. When 0δ = , from 
1 1( ) ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( )H L L H H LM q M q q M q q M qδ π δ π− = − − − − − , we know 1 ˆHq q= , thus 
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the submission strategy for the newly produced papers is exactly the same as the one period case 
illustrated in section 3.  
 
3.2.2 Multiple submissions  
In this case, we assume that in the paper’s fist period, an author can choose to submit his new 
paper to one journal or to both journals. If the paper is submitted to only one journal and gets 
rejected by this journal, the author can resubmit it to a different journal in the following period. If 
the paper is submitted to both journals and gets rejected by both, the author cannot resubmit it in 
the future. Compared with the case analyzed in section 3.1, every paper can be submitted at most 
twice in both cases. The difference is that in the previous case each paper can be submitted to 
only one journal per period but in this case we allow multiple submissions. If an author 
simultaneously submits his paper to both journals in the first period, he loses the opportunity of 
resubmission in the second period.  Thus, if he submits the paper to only one journal in this 
period, he can resubmit it in next period when it is rejected and gets a discounted expected payoff. 
So for an author there is a trade-off between choosing “single submission” and “multiple 
submissions” in the current period.  
1
RA
H L
AR
H
L N
N
22
N,H L
 
Figure 7: “Decision tree” of multiple submissions 
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The decision tree for an author is shown in figure 7, where action “ ,H L ” represents submitting 
the paper to both journals and the other notations are the same as in figure 4. In period 1t = , the 
expected payoff of submitting a paper with quality q  to both journals is as follows: 
 
(40)       
, ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( )
( ) [1 ( )] ( )
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ( )
H L H H H H L L L
H H L L L
H H L H L
M q q B P q q B P
M q q q B P
M q q M q q P
π π π
π π
π π
= − + − −
                = + − −
                = + − −
 
 
According to the analysis in section 3.1.2, we know there exist unique 2q  and 3q such that  
, 2 2( ) ( )H L HM q M q= and , 3 3( ) ( )H L LM q M q= , and it’s also satisfied that 0 3 2ˆHq q q q< < < . So 
the curve of , ( )H LM q  is shown in figure 8. 
( )HM q
( )LM q
q
ˆHqˆLq 0
q
2q
, ( )H LM q
3q 1( )q δ
Figure 8: Expected payoff of submitting to journal H, L in period 2 and submitting to both 
journals in period 1 
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Obviously, the first period submission strategy for an author having a paper with quality q  
depends on the relative magnitude of 1 ,( ), ( )H H LM q M q  and 1 ( )LM q . By comparing the values 
of  1 ,( ), ( )H H LM q M q  and 1 ( )LM q , authors choose whether and where to submit the papers in 
the first period.  We define 2 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )H H LD q M q M q≡ −  and 3 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )L H LD q M q M q≡ − . 
 
Lemma 6:  1 ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q  cross only once 
 
Proof: 
Since 3 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )L H LD q M q M q≡ − , then  
(41) 
3 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
[1 (1 )]
L H L
L L H H H L L L
H L L L H
D q M q M q
M M M B P
B M
δ π π π
π π δ π
= −
           = + − − + − −
           = − − −
 
(42)  3
( )
( ) [1 (1 )]L L H L H L H H L H
dD q
B B M
dq
π π π π δ π π δπ′ ′ ′ ′= + − − − −  
Evaluating  3
( )dD q
dq
 at 3( ) 0D q =   yields: 
(43)   3
( )
( ) [1 (1 )]
1 (1 )
H H L
L L H L H L H H L L
H L
dD q
B B B
dq
π π π
π π π π δ π π δπ
π δ π
′
′ ′ ′= + − − − −
− −
 
 
Simplifying (43), we have the following expression: 
(44) 
3( ) ( ) [1 (1 )]
1 (1 )
1
[1 (1 )]
1 (1 )
L H H H L
L H L L H H L L
L H H L
L H H
H L L L H H
L L H H
dD q
B B B
dq
B B
π π π π π
π π δ π π δπ
π π π δ π
π π πδ
π π δ π π
π δ π π π
′ ′ ′
′= + − − − −
− −
 ′ ′ ′    −
             = + − − −     
− −      
 
By Assumption 3, we know that the hazard rate 
( )
( )
1 ( )
g x
h x
G x
≡
−
 is increasing in x , thus H L
H L
π π
π π
′ ′
>  
since H Ls q s q− > − . Thus we have the following expression:  
    
 
 
59 
 
 
(45)
3( ) 1 [1 (1 )]
1 (1 )
1
[1 (1 )]
1 (1 )
L H H
H L L L H H
L L H H
H H H
H L L L H H
H L H H
H
H
dD q
B B
dq
B B
π π πδ
π π δ π π
π δ π π π
π π πδ
π π δ π π
π δ π π π
π
π
 ′ ′ ′    −
 = + − − −     
− −      
 ′ ′ ′    −
             ≤ + − − −     
− −      
′ 
             = 

( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }22
2 1
[1 (1 )]
1 (1 )
2 1 1
1 (1 )
L
H L L L H
L
H H
H L L H L L H
H L
B B
B B B B B
δ δπ
π π δ π
δ π
π π
δ δ π δ δ π δ
π δ π
 − + 
− − − 
− −  
′  
             = − − − − − − −  
− −  
 
 
If ( ) 0H LB Bδ − ≥ , the term in last bracket is negative and we have 
( )3
3
0
( )
0
D q
dD q
dq =
< ; If 
( ) 0H LB Bδ − < , since 0 1Lπ≤ ≤ , we have 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )
22
2
2 1 1
2 1 1 2
H L L H L L H
H L H L H L H
B B B B B
B B B B B B B
δ δ π δ δ π δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ
− − − − − − −
< − − − − − − − = − −
 
 
From Assumption 6 or 2H LB B≥ , we know that ( )2 0L HB Bδ− − < . Thus we always have 
( )3
3
0
( )
0
D q
dD q
dq =
<  δ∀ . Therefore, the difference between 1 ( )LM q  and , ( )H LM q  is 
monotonically decreasing in q . Combined 
with 3 0( ) [1 (1 )] 0H L L L H H L LD q B M Bπ π δ π π π= − − − = >  
and 3lim ( ) 2 0L H H L H
q
D q B P B B B
→+∞
= + − < − ≤ , we know that 1 ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q cross 
exactly once.           
                                                                                                                                          (Q.E.D) 
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Lemma 7:   There exist either zero or two roots to the equation ( )2 0D q = . 
Proof: 
Since 2 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )H H LD q M q M q= − . Then  
(46) 
2 1 ,( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( )][ ( ) ] [1 ( )] ( )
( ) (1 )[1 ( )]
H H L L H L L L H L L
L L H L
D q M q M q P q q B P q q B
q P q M
δ π π π π
π δ π
= − = + − − − −
           = − − −
  
  
Under Assumption 2, we know that ( )2lim (1 ) 0L
q
D q Pδ
→−∞
= − >  and ( )2lim 0L
q
D q P
→+∞
= > . 
 
(47) 2
( )
(1 ) [ (1 ) ]L H L L H H L
dD q
P B
dq
δ π δ π π π π′ ′ ′= + − − −  
(48)
2
2
2
( )
(1 ) ( 2 )L H L H L H L H L L
d D q
P B
dq
δ π δ π π π π π π π′′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′= + − + + −  
Evaluating 
2
2
2
( )d D q
dq
 at 2
( )
0
dD q
dq
=   yields: 
 
(49) 
( )
( )2
2
2
2
0
(1 ) (1 ) ( 2 )H L H L LH L L H L H L H L L
HdD dq
d D q
B B
dq
π π π π π
π δ δ π π π π π π π
π
=
′ ′ ′+ −
′′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′= − − + − + + −
′
 
 
Simplifying (49), we have the following expression: 
(50) 
( )
( )2
2
2
2
0
2
(1 )
(1 ) 2
(1 )
H H L H H L H L H H L H L
L
HdD dq
L L H H
L L H H H
L L H H
L
d D q
B
dq
B
B
π π π π π π π π π π π π π
δ
π
π π π π
δ π π π π
π π π π
δ
=
′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′+ − − +
= −
′
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ 
′ ′                               = − + − − + ′ ′ ′ ′ 
′                               = − 2 (1 )( )H LL H H
H L
π π
π π π
π π
′′ ′′ 
′ + − − ′ ′ 
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Define ( ) ( )lny gα α≡    , then ( )
( )
( )
g
y
g
α
α
α
′
′ = . By Assumption 3 or the log-concavity of the 
density function g , we know that ( ) 0y α′′ ≤  or ( )
( )
g
g
α
α
′
 is decreasing (non-increasing) in α . 
Then
( )
( )
( )
( )
0
L HH L
H L L H
g s q g s q
g s q g s q
π π
π π
′ ′− −′′ ′′ 
− = − > ′ ′ − − 
 since H Ls q s q− > − . Because , 0H Lπ π ′′ > , 
1δ <  and (1 ) 0Hπ− > , we know that  
( )
( )2
2
2
2
0
0
dD dq
d D q
dq
=
> .  So whenever  2 0
dD
dq
=  , 
2
2
2
0
d D
dq
> , which implies that given the continuity of 2
dD
dq
, there can be at most one extreme 
point, and that extreme point is a minimum.  Therefore, ( )2D q  can cross the zero axis at most 
twice. Combined with ( )2lim (1 ) 0L
q
D q Pδ
→−∞
= − >  and ( )2lim 0L
q
D q P
→+∞
= > , we know that there 
are either zero or two values of q  s.t. ( )2 0D q = . 
(Q.E.D) 
 
 
Lemma 8:  Given the functions Hπ  and Lπ , ∃  ˆ( ) 1
L
L
B
P
δ < , s.t. for ˆδ δ> , 
1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q> q∀ . This critical discount factor δˆ  is increasing in 
L
L
B
P
. 
Proof: 
Since 2 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )H H LD q M q M q= − , we know that  
(51)   [ ] ( )
[ ] ( )
2 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 )
1 (1 ) 1
1 (1 )
H H L
L H H L L
H L L
L H
H L
D q M q M q
P B
B
P
P
δ π δ π π
δ π π
δ π
δ π
= −
           = − − − − −
  − −             = − − −  − −   
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Since both Hπ  and Lπ are functions of q given other parameters, we can define 
( )1 (1 )
( , , ) 1
1 (1 )
H LL L
L H L
B B
V q
P P
δ π π
δ
δ π
  − −  
≡ −  − −   
. When 1δ = , we see that ( ,1, ) 1 0L
L
B
V q
P
= > . In 
addition, 
[ ]2
(1 )
0
1 (1 )
L L H H
L H
BV
P
π π π
δ δ π
−∂
= >
∂ − −
. Since V is continuous inδ , there exists ˆ 1δ <  s.t. 
ˆδ δ∀ ≥   0V ≥ .  Also, 
( )1 (1 )
0
( / ) 1 (1 )
H L
L L H
V
B P
δ π π
δ π
− −∂
= − <
∂ − −
. Thus, by the implicit function 
theorem we know that: 
(52)  
/ ( )
ˆ
0
( / ) /
L
L
L L
B
V
Pd
d B P V
δ
δ
∂ ∂
= − >
∂ ∂
 
 
Therefore, given the functions Hπ  and Lπ , ∃  ˆ( )
L
L
B
P
δ  s.t. for ˆδ δ> , 0V >  q∀  or 
2 1 ,( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H LD q M q M q= − > q∀  since [ ]1 (1 )L HP δ π− − >0 
(Q.E.D) 
 
From Lemma 8, we can derive the following Corollary 4. 
Corollary 4: When authors are patient enough, they will never simultaneously submit their 
papers to both journals. 
 
Proof: 
By Lemma 8, we know that given parameter L
L
B
P
, there is a critical discount factor ˆ( ) 1L
L
B
P
δ <  
such that for ˆδ δ> , 1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q> q∀ . So, when the discount factor δ  is large enough, 
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multiple submission will be dominated by only submitting to the high quality journal. Thus, if 
authors are patient enough, they will never simultaneously submit their papers to both journals. 
(Q.E.D) 
 
For the rest of this section, we assume ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ< . From Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, there exists two 
roots ( )lq δ  and 4 ( )q δ to the equation 2 ( ) 0D q = , where 4ˆ
l
Lq q q< < , and 2 ( ) 0D q <  for 
4( , )
lq q q∈ . Since ( )1 1 1 1, 0H H LD q B M M= − = , we know that  1q  is a function of HB  given the 
other parameters. From previous analysis, we have [ )1 ˆ ,Lq q∈ +∞  for ( ,l uH H HB B B ∈  , where 
( )ˆ
u H
H
H L
P
B
qπ
= and lH L H LB B P P= + − . By Proposition 3, we know that 1( ) 0D q = has a unique 
root 1q  and 1 1( ) 0D q′ >  or 1 ( )HM q  and 1 ( )LM q have the single crossing point at 1q . Since 
1( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( ) {1 [1 ( )]} ( )L H H LD q q M q q M qδ π δ π= − − − − − , thus 
1 {1 (1 )} 0L H
H
D
B
δ π π
∂
= − − >
∂
. 
According to the implicit function theorem, we have  
(53)  1 1
1 1
/
0
/
H
H
dq D B
dB D q
∂ ∂
= − <
∂ ∂
 
Then we have the following Lemma 9. 
 
Lemma 9:  Given ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ<  and , ,L L HB P P , there exist (, ,l uH H H HB B B B ′ ′′ ∈   with H HB B′ ′′< , 
where 1 4( )Hq B q′ =  and 1( )
l
Hq B q′′ = . Hence: 
1) ( ) 1 4,lH H HB B B q q′∈ → >  
2) [ ] 1 4, ,lH H HB B B q q q ′ ′′∈ → ∈    
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3) 1 ˆ, ,
u l
H H H LB B B q q q   ′′∈ → ∈     
 
Proof: 
For ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ< , there exist two roots ( )lq δ  and 4 ( )q δ to 2 ( ) 0D q = , where 4
lq q< . We know 
that [ )1 ˆ ,Lq q∈ ∞  for ( ,l uH H HB B B ∈   and 4ˆ lLq q q< < . Since 1q  is a continuous function of HB  
and 1 0
H
dq
dB
< , as HB  increases from 
l
HB  to 
u
HB , there must exist (, ,l uH H H HB B B B ′ ′′ ∈  , where 
1 4( )Hq B q′ = , 1( )
l
Hq B q′′ =  and H HB B′ ′′< . Thus, we have 1 4q q> as ( ),lH H HB B B′∈ , 1 4,lq q q ∈    
as [ ],H H HB B B′ ′′∈  and 1 ˆ , lLq q q ∈    as ,
u
H H HB B B ′′∈   . 
 
(Q.E.D) 
 
By Lemma 6, we know that 1 ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q have a single cross point. Suppose this single 
crossing point is 5q , thus 3 5( ) 0D q = . Since 0( ) 0HM q = and 
3 1 ,( ) ( ) ( ) [1 (1 )]L H L H L L L HD q M q M q B Mπ π δ π= −  = − − − , we have 3 0( ) 0H L LD q Bπ π= > . 
Because 3 5( ) 0D q =  and 
( )3
3
0
( )
0
D q
dD q
dq =
< , we know that 0 5q q< . By Lemma 9, we have the 
following Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: If Assumptions 1- 6 hold and given L
L
B
P
, assume the discount factor 
satisfies ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ<  so that there exist two roots lq and 4q  to equation ( )2 0D q = , where 4lq q< .  
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As the submission benefit in the high quality journal HB  changes, there exist three possible 
submission strategies. 
 
1) For ( ),lH H HB B B′∈  , authors will have the following submission pattern: 
 
• When [ ]0ˆ ,Lq q q∈ , submit to the low quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, don’t 
submit in period 2. 
• When [ ]0 1,q q q∈ , submit to the low quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit to 
the high quality journal in period 2. 
• When [ ]1,q q∈ ∞ , submit to the high quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit to 
the low quality journal in period 2. 
 
 
2) For [ ],H H HB B B′ ′′∈  , authors will have the following submission pattern: 
 
• When [ ]0ˆ ,Lq q q∈ , submit to the low quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, don’t 
submit in period 2. 
• When [ ]0 5,q q q∈ , submit to the low quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit to 
the high quality journal in period 2. 
• When [ ]5 4,q q q∈ , submit to both journals in period 1. 
• When [ ]4 ,q q∈ ∞ , submit to the high quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit to 
the low quality journal in period 2. 
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3) For , uH H HB B B ′′∈    , authors will have the following submission pattern: 
 
• When [ ]0ˆ ,Lq q q∈ , submit to the low quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, don’t 
submit in period 2. 
• When [ ]0 1,q q q∈ , submit to the low quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit to 
the high quality journal in period 2. 
• When 1,
lq q q ∈   , submit to the high quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit 
to the low quality journal in period 2. 
• When 4,
lq q q ∈   , submit to both journals in period 1. 
• When [ ]4 ,q q∈ ∞ , submit to the high quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, submit to 
the low quality journal in period 2. 
 
 
Proof: 
Given parameters L
L
B
P
, assume ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ< , we know that there exist two roots lq  and 4q to 
equation 2 ( ) 0D q = , where 4
lq q< . Thus, ( )2 0D q < or 1 ,( ) ( ) 0H H LM q M q− <  when 
4( , )
lq q q∈ . According to Lemma 9, we will have the following three submission strategies: 
 
1) If ( ),lH H HB B B′∈  then 1 4q q> , and at  1q q=  we have 1 1 , 1( ) ( )H H LM q M q>  or 
3 1( ) 0D q > . Because 3 5( ) 0D q =  and 
( )3
3
0
( )
0
D q
dD q
dq =
< ,  it must be true that 1 5q q< . 
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Therefore, when 1q q≤ , we have ( )1 0D q ≤  and 3 1( ) 0D q > , thus 1 1( ) ( )L HM q M q≥ and 
1 ,( ) ( )L H LM q M q> . So submitting to the low quality journal in period 1 is the dominant 
strategy. When 1q q> , we have ( )1 0D q > and ( )2 0D q > , thus 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q>  and 
1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q> , and thus submitting to the high quality journal is the dominant strategy. 
According to previous analysis, we know that 0 1ˆLq q q< < . Thus, if [ ]0ˆ ,Lq q q∈ , 
since ( ) 0HM q ≤  there is no submission in period 2 if rejected in period 1; if [ ]0 1,q q q∈ , the 
paper will be resubmitted to the high quality journal in period 2 if rejected in period 1. 
Therefore, authors have the first submission pattern identified in the proposition.     
 
 
2) If [ ],H H HB B B′ ′′∈  then 1 4,lq q q ∈   , and thus at  1q q= , 
1 1 1 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( )L H H LM q M q M q= < , implying 3 1 1 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0L H LD q M q M q= − < . Since 
3 5( ) 0D q =  and
( )3
3
0
( )
0
D q
dD q
dq =
< , it must be that 5 1q q< . Further, at ,
lq  
( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1l l lH L H LM q M q M q= ≤ , where the last equality holds because 1lq q≤ .  Thus, 
it must be true that 5
lq q>  and hence:  5 1 4
lq q q q< < <  for [ ],H H HB B B′ ′′∈ .  Therefore: 
 
• When 5q q≤ , we have ( )1 0D q <  and ( )3 0D q ≥ , and thus 1 1( ) ( )L HM q M q>  and 
1 ,( ) ( )L H LM q M q≥ . Since 0 5ˆLq q q< < , so when [ ]0ˆ ,Lq q q∈ , authors will submit the 
paper to only the low quality journal in the first period and will not resubmit the paper in 
the second period if rejected in the first period; when [ ]0 5,q q q∈ , authors will submit the 
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paper to only the low quality journal in the first period and resubmit to the high quality 
journal in the second period if rejected in the first period.  
 
• When 5 4q q q< < , we have ( )3 0D q <  and ( )2 0D q < , thus  
1 ,( ) ( )L H LM q M q< and 1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q< . Thus, authors will choose to simultaneously 
submit their papers to both journals in the first period. 
 
•  Finally, when 4 1q q q≥ > , we have ( )1 0D q > and ( )2 0D q ≥ , thus 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q>  
and 1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q≥ . So authors will submit the paper to only the high quality journal 
in the first period and resubmit to the low quality journal in the second period if rejected 
in the first period. 
 
3) If , uH H HB B B ′′∈    then 1 0 , ,
lq q q ∈    where 0 ˆLq q>  and thus: 
 
• When 1q q≤ , we have ( )1 0D q ≤  and ( )2 0D q > , thus 1 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )L H H LM q M q M q≥ >  . 
Since 0 1ˆLq q q< < , when [ ]0ˆ ,Lq q q∈ , the optimal strategy is to submitting to the low 
quality journal in period 1 and if rejected, don’t submit to the high quality journal  in 
period 2; when [ ]0 1,q q q∈ , submitting to only the low quality journal in period 1 and if 
rejected, re-submitting to the high quality journal in period 2 is the optimal strategy. 
 
• When 1
lq q q< ≤ , we have ( )1 0D q >  and ( )2 0D q > , thus 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q>  and 
1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q≥ . And thus submitting to only the high quality journal in period 1 and 
if rejected, re-submitting to the low quality journal in period 2 is the optimal strategy. 
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• When 4
lq q q< < , we have ( )1 0D q > and ( )2 0D q < , thus , 1 1( ) ( ) ( )H L H LM q M q M q> >    
and submitting to both journals in the first period is the dominant strategy. 
 
• Finally, when 4q q≥ , we have ( )1 0D q > and ( )2 0D q > , thus 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q>  and 
1 ,( ) ( )H H LM q M q≥ . Thus, submitting to only the high quality journal in period 1 and if 
rejected, re-submitting to the low quality journal in period 2 is the optimal strategy. 
 
 (Q.E.D) 
 
 
From the above analysis, we know that given the ratio of the publication benefit to submission fee 
in the low quality journal, if authors’ are patient enough they will never submit their papers to 
both journals simultaneously. Otherwise, whether the multiple-submission may occur in their 
optimal submission strategy depends on the magnitude of the publication benefit in the high 
quality journal. When the publication benefit in the high quality journal is small enough, authors 
will never include multiple-submission in their strategy. When the publication benefit in the high 
quality journal is relatively large, multiple-submission is possible and an author’s strategy 
depends on the paper’s quality. As the paper’s quality increases, the submission decision changes 
from submitting to only the low quality journal, to submitting to both journals then to submitting 
to only the high quality journal. When the publication benefit in the high quality journal is large 
enough, an author’s submission decision changes from submitting to only the low quality journal, 
to submitting to only the high quality journal, to submitting to both journals, then to submitting to 
only the high quality journal as the paper’s quality increases. 
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To investigate the expected per-period number of submissions and average quality of accepted 
papers in both journals, we assume that [ , ]H H HB B B′ ′′∈ . Thus, authors will have the second 
submission pattern as discussed in Proposition 4. The submission strategy in this case can be 
illustrated in table 3.  
 
Table 3: submission strategy in “multiple submissions”
1t = 2t =
4[ , )q q∈ + ∞
5 4[ , )q q q∈
0ˆ[ , )Lq q q∈
ˆ( , )Lq q∈ − ∞
H L
L N
N N
if rejected
,H L
if rejected
0 5[ , )q q q∈ L H
if rejected
 
According to table 3, it’s straightforward to see that the per-period expected number of 
submissions to journal H is as follows: 
 
(54)     5
0
5 5 0 0 5
5
[1 ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ( | )
[1 ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
MS
H L
q
L
q
N N F q N F q F q Prob q s q q q
N F q N f q G s q dq
α= − + − + < ≤ <
         = − + −   ∫
 
 
The average quality of the papers accepted for publication in journal H  is: 
    
 
 
71 
 
(55)    
5
5 0
5
5 0
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
q
H L H
q qMS
H q
H L H
q q
qf q G s q dq qf q G s q G s q dq
Q
f q G s q dq f q G s q G s q dq
+∞
+∞
− − + − − −
=
− − + − − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
 
And the expected per-period number of submissions to journal L is as follows: 
(56)     
4
4 4 4
4
ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [1 ( )] ( | )
ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
MS
L L H
L H
q
N N F q F q N F q Prob q s q q
N F q F q N f q G s q dq
α
+∞
= − + − + < ≥
         = − + −∫
 
 
 
The average quality of the paper accepted for publication in journal L  is: 
(57)    
4
4
4
4
ˆ
ˆ
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
( )[1 ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
L
L
q
L H L
q qMS
L q
L H L
q q
qf q G s q dq qf q G s q G s q dq
Q
f q G s q dq f q G s q G s q dq
+∞
+∞
− − + − − −
=
− − + − − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
 
              
Compared to the “single submission” case analyzed in section 4.1, we have the following 
relations: 
 
(58)      1 5 5 0 0 5
1 0 0 1
[ ( ) ( )] { [ ( ) ( )] ( | )
[ ( ) ( )] ( | )}
MS
H H L
L
N N N F q F q N F q F q Prob q s q q q
N F q F q Prob q s q q q
α
α
− = − + − + < ≤ <
                 − − + < ≤ <
 
 
(59)      4 1
4 4 1 1
[ ( ) ( )]
{ [1 ( )] ( | ) [1 ( )] ( | )}
MS
L L
H H
N N N F q F q
N F q Prob q s q q N F q Prob q s q qα α
− = − +
                − + < ≥ − − + < ≥
 
 
Therefore, we know the following: 
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(60)      
5 1
0 0
1
5
1 5
1 5
[ ( ) ( )] { ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }
[ ( ) ( )] { ( ) ( ) }
q q
MS
H H L L
q q
q
L
q
N N N F q F q N f q G s q dq f q G s q dq
N F q F q N f q G s q dq
− = − + − − −
                   = − − −
∫ ∫
∫
 
Since 0 ( ) 1LG s q< − <  and 1 5q q> ,  so 
1 1
5 5
1 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
q q
L
q q
f q G s q dq f q dq F q F q− < = −∫ ∫  
 
Thus, 1 5 1 5[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] 0
MS
H HN N N F q F q N F q F q− > − − − =  
 
 
(61)      
4 1
4
1
4 1
4 1
[ ( ) ( )] { ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }
[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
MS
L L H H
q q
q
H
q
N N N F q F q N f q G s q dq f q G s q dq
N F q F q N f q G s q dq
+∞ +∞
− = − + − − −
= − − −
∫ ∫
∫
 
 
Since 0 ( ) 1HG s q< − <  and 4 1q q> ,  so 
4 4
1 1
4 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
q q
H
q q
f q G s q dq f q dq F q F q− < = −∫ ∫  
Thus, 
 
4 1 4 1[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] 0
MS
L LN N N F q F q N F q F q− > − − − =  
 
 
 
So the per period number of submission in both journals under multiple-submission will be 
higher than that under single submission. Both the sign of ( )MSH HQ Q−  and ( )
MS
L LQ Q− are 
ambiguous. So, we cannot say that a multiple-submission policy would deteriorate the average 
quality of accepted papers. In order to illustrate these, we assume that each author produces a 
paper with the random quality [1,1]q N∼ , and we calibrate the model to get some numerical 
simulation results which are reported in next chapter. So far, we have illustrated that the expected 
per-period number of submissions in both journals under “multiple submissions” are higher than 
those under “single submission” and the average quality of accepted papers in both journals when 
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multiple submissions were allowed is not necessarily lower than that in the case of single 
submission. The results are illustrated in the following corollary 5. 
 
 
Corollary 5:   
Since the average quality of accepted papers in both journals under “multiple-submission” can be 
lower than that under “single submission”, a multiple-submission policy may not necessarily 
reduce the average quality of published papers.  
 
( )HM q
( )LM q
q
ˆHqˆ Lq 0
q
2q
, ( )H LM q
3q 1 ( )q δ
4 ( )q δ5 ( )q δ
 
Figure 9: Some quality thresholds in the submission strategy 
 
Figure 9 shows the quality partitions which determine the author’s optimal submission strategy. 
From figure 9, we know that 4 ( )q δ is determined by , 4 1 4( ) ( )H L HM q M q= , and  4 2( )q qδ →  as 
0δ → . In particular, there is , 4 1 4 4( ) ( ) ( )H L H HM q M q M q= =  when 0δ = , so we have 4 2q q= . 
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Also, 5 ( )q δ  is determined by , 5 1 5( ) ( )H L LM q M q= , and  5 3( )q qδ →  as 0δ → . When 0δ = , 
we know , 5 1 5 5( ) ( ) ( )H L L LM q M q M q= = , so 5 3q q= .   
 
ˆLq
0q
q
H L→
L H→
L N→
N
5 ( )q δ
4 ( )q δ
3q
2q
&H L
δ0
δˆ
1
ˆ( )q δ
ˆHq
1 ( )q δ
Figure 10: Submission strategy in “multiple submission” as δ changes 
 
 
Figure 10 illustrates how the quality thresholds which determine an author’s optimal submission 
strategy change as the discount factor changes.  As shown in figure 10, when the discount factor 
δ  decreases, the number of papers that will be simultaneously submitted to both journals in the 
first period increases. In other words, as the authors become less patient, they are more likely to 
submit their new papers to both journals so as to get a higher probability of being accepted for 
publication in current period instead of waiting until next period. 
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Corollary 5 illustrates the author’s optimal submission strategy when ˆδ δ< . If ˆδ δ≥ , authors will 
never choose to simultaneously submit their papers to both journals. It’s straightforward to see 
from figure 10 that as δ  increases, 4q  declines and 5q rises and the area for multiple submissions 
shrink.  The two points 4q  and 5q will converge to 1q  when δ  reaches δˆ . After ˆδ δ≥ ,   there is 
no area for  multiple submissions and the author’s submission strategy  is exactly the same as the 
“single submission” case analyzed in section 3.1. Lemma 8 implies that if the authors are 
sufficiently patient, the “multiple submissions” will always be dominated by “single submission”. 
In other words, the authors would rather resubmit their papers in the second period than 
simultaneously submit the papers to both journals in the first period. Also, as the authors becomes 
more patient, there will be more submissions to the high quality journal in the first period.  
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CHAPTER 4.  NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
 
In this section, we will do some comparative static analysis to show how the quality thresholds 
which determine authors’ submission strategies change as the parameters vary. Then, we perform 
numerical simulations to compare the expected per-period number of submissions and the 
average quality of accepted papers in both journals under the single and multiple submission 
policy regimes. 
 
4.1 Simulation for the case of single submission  
 
According to the analysis in section 3.1, we know that ˆHq  is determined by 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )H H L HM q M q= or ˆ ˆ[1 ( )] [1 ( )]H H H H L L H LB G s q P B G s q P− − − = − − −  
Assuming 2[0, ]Nα σ∼ , ˆHq is determined by 
(62) 
ˆ ˆ
[1 ( )] [1 ( )]H H L HH H L L
s q s q
B P B P
σ σ
− −
− Φ − = − Φ −  
Differentiating (62) with respect to ˆHq  and σ  we get: 
(63) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )( ) ( )( )
ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( )
H H L H
H H H L L H
H
H H L H
H L
s q s q
B s q B s q
q
s q s q
B B
φ φ
σ σ
σ σ φ φ
σ σ
− −
− − −∂
= −
− −∂ −
 
According to Assumption 3, we know that the hazard rate is monotonically increasing or  
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ
1 ( ) 1 ( )
H H L H
H H L H
s q s q
s q s q
φ φ
σ σ
σ σ
− −
>
− −
− Φ − Φ
 
0q  is determined by 0( ) 0HM q =  or 0[1 ( )] 0H H HB G s q P− − − =  or 
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(64) 0[1 ( )] 0HH H
s q
B P
σ
−
− Φ − =  
Differentiating (64) with respect to 0q  and σ  we get: 
(65) 0 0
1
( )H
q
s q
σ σ
∂
= − −
∂
 
Because  0 0[1 ( )] 0 ( ) 1H H HH H
H
s q s q P
B P
Bσ σ
− −
− Φ − = ⇒ Φ = −  
If 2H HB P≥ , 
0
0
1
( ) 1 0
2
H H
H
H
s q P
s q
Bσ
−
Φ = − ≥ ⇒ − ≥ , thus 0 0
1
( ) 0H
q
s q
σ σ
∂
= − − ≤
∂
 
If 2H HB P< , 
0
0
1
( ) 1 0
2
H H
H
H
s q P
s q
Bσ
−
Φ = − < ⇒ − < , thus 0 0
1
( ) 0H
q
s q
σ σ
∂
= − − >
∂
 
 
ˆLq  is determined by ˆ( ) 0L LM q =  or ˆ[1 ( )] 0L L L LB G s q P− − − =  or 
(66) 
ˆ
[1 ( )] 0L LL L
s q
B P
σ
−
− Φ − =  
Differentiating (66) with respect to ˆLq  and σ  we get: 
(67)  
ˆ 1
ˆ( )L L L
q
s q
σ σ
∂
= − −
∂
 
Because  
ˆ ˆ
[1 ( )] 0 0 ( ) 1L L L L LL L
L
s q s q P
B P
Bσ σ
− −
− Φ − = = ⇒ Φ = −  
If 2L LB P≥ , 
ˆ 1
ˆ( ) 1 0
2
L L L
L L
L
s q P
s q
Bσ
−
Φ = − ≥ ⇒ − ≥ , thus 
ˆ 1
ˆ( ) 0L L L
q
s q
σ σ
∂
= − − ≤
∂
 
If 2L LB P< , 
ˆ 1
ˆ( ) 1 0
2
L L L
L L
L
s q P
s q
Bσ
−
Φ = − < ⇒ − < , thus 
ˆ 1
ˆ( ) 0L L L
q
s q
σ σ
∂
= − − >
∂
 
 
We can use numerical simulation to see how quality thresholds change with respect to referee’s 
quality assessment error σ . Choosing parameters as 20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B S S P P= = = = = =  
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and 0.85δ = , which satisfy the Assumptions 1-6, we did the simulation and the following figure 
11 show how the quality thresholds change as σ  varies.  
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Figure 11: Quality thresholds in single submission and single period case 
 
 
From the simulation results as shown in figure 11, we can see that Lq , 0q and ˆHq  decrease as the 
variance of referee’s quality assessment error increases.  
 
When referees have quality assessment errors, an author’s quality threshold of submission 
wouldn’t be the same as the journal’s quality standard. But if referees have perfect assessment of 
    
 
 
79 
 
papers’ quality, any paper with quality lower than journal’s standard will be rejected, thus an 
author’s quality threshold of submission will equal to the journal’s quality standard since we 
assume an author has perfect information about the quality of his paper. As the variance of 
referee’s quality assessment error decreases to a small number, e.g. 0.01σ = , we have the quality 
thresholds: 0.9916Lq = , 0 2.9872q = , 2.9948Hq = . Therefore, as referee’s quality assessment is 
more accurate, the quality threshold of submitting to low quality journal 0.9916Lq =  is very 
close to its quality standard 1Ls =  and the quality threshold of submitting to the high quality 
journal is very close to its quality standard 3Hs = . Thus, the quality threshold of submitting to 
both journals converges to their standards as the variance of referees’ quality assessment error 
shrinks to zero.  
 
We can also do simulation to reproduce figure 6  to show how quality thresholds, which 
determine author’s submission strategy in both single and multiple submission, change as 
discount factor δ  varies. Choosing parameters as 20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B s s P P= = = = = =  
and 1σ = , as discount factor δ  changes from 0 to 1, with 0.01 increase in each step, we did 
simulation to calculate and plot the value of quality thresholds Lq , 0q and 1q , where 1q  is the 
quality threshold of submitting to journal H and L  at first period in the two-period and single 
submission case. Corollary 3 states that the quality threshold for a paper to be submitted to the 
high quality journal in the first period decreases as the author’s discount factor increases. 
The following figure 12 shows that 1q decreases as δ  increases, which is consistent with the 
analysis in Corollary 3 and figure 6. 
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           Figure 12: Quality thresholds as discount factor changes in single submission 
 
 
Choosing the parameters to be 20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B s s P P= = = = = = , we can also perform 
simulations to show how the author’s quality threshold varies as both the variance of the referee’s 
quality assessment error and the author’s discount factor change in the two-period and single 
submission case. As the authors’ discount factor changes from 0 to 1 and the variance of referee’s 
quality assessment error changes from 0.5 to 1 with 0.1 in each step, we did numerical simulation 
on 1q , which is the quality threshold between submitting to journal H and journal L  in first 
period. The simulation result is shown in the following figure 13-1. 
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Figure 13-1: q1 is below high quality journal’s standard 
 
 
From the above figure, we know that 1q  is less than the high quality journal’s standard 3Hs =  
given the chosen parameters. In this case, as the variance of the referee’s quality assessment error 
decreases 1q  increases and as the author’s discount factor decreases 1q  increases. In other words, 
as authors become less patient and referee’s quality assessment gets more accurate, the quality 
threshold of submitting to high quality journal increases, which implies that only those papers 
with relatively high quality will be submitted to the high quality journal when authors are not 
very patient and referees have accurate quality assessment. When discount factor 0δ =  and 
variance of quality assessment error 0.5σ = , 1q  reaches the highest point  2.7377. 
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Figure 13-2: q1 is above the high quality journal’s standard 
 
                                                                                                     
When the high quality journal’s publication benefit is large, some papers with quality below the 
high journal’s standard will be submitted to journalH . But if the publication benefit HB  is 
relatively low, the high quality journal will not be so attractive to those authors with low quality 
papers and we expect 1q to be greater than Hs . If we decrease the high quality journal’s 
publication benefit from 20HB =  to 7HB = and keep the other parameters unchanged, we can 
perform another simulation to show how the author’s quality threshold varies as both the variance 
of the referee’s quality assessment error and the author’s discount factor change in the two-period 
and single submission case. The simulation result is shown in figure 13-2. From the above figure, 
we know that 1q  is now above the high quality journal’s standard 3Hs =  in this case. And 1q  
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increases as the variance of the referee’s quality assessment error increases. We still have that 1q  
increases as the author’s discount factor decreases. In other words, as authors become less patient 
and referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate, the quality threshold of submitting to high 
quality journal increases, which implies that more papers will be submitted to the high quality 
journal when authors are not very patient and referees have less accurate quality assessment. 
When discount factor 0δ =  and variance of quality assessment error 1σ = , 1q  reaches the 
highest point  4.0641. 
 
 
 
4.2 Simulation for the case of multiple-submission 
 
From the analysis in section 3.2, we know that given the ratio of publication benefit to submission 
fee in the low quality journal L
L
B
P
, if authors’ are patient enough such that ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ> , they will 
never submit their papers to both journals simultaneously. Otherwise, if ˆ( )L
L
B
P
δ δ< , then whether 
the multiple-submission is possible in their submission strategy depends on the magnitude of the 
publication benefit in the high quality journal HB . When the publication benefit in high quality 
journal is small enough, authors will never include multiple-submission in their strategy. When 
the publication benefit in the high quality journal is relatively large, multiple-submission is 
possible and the author’s first period decision changes from submitting to only the low quality 
journal, to submitting to both journals, then to submitting to only the high quality journal as the 
paper’s quality increases.  
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Figure 14:  Expected submission benefits when authors are patient enough 
 
 
Let parameters take values 20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B s s P P= = = = = = , 1σ = . As a paper’s 
quality q changes, we can do a numerical simulation to plot the values of publication benefits 
1 ( )HM q , 1 ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q  to show how these curves intersect with each other,  which could 
straightforwardly show the author’s submission strategy.  Suppose authors are patient enough by 
choosing a very large discount factor 0.99δ = , the simulation result in following figure 14 shows 
that when q has a low value, 1 ( )LM q is larger than 1 ( )HM q and , ( )H LM q , which means that 
submitting to the low quality journal in first stage is the dominant strategy; As q increases , 
1 ( )HM q is larger than both 1 ( )LM q  and , ( )H LM q , and submitting to the high quality journal in 
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the first period is the dominant strategy.  Thus, when authors are patient enough they will never 
choose multiple-submission. According to the simulation result, 1 ( )LM q and 1 ( )HM q intersects at 
1.85q = , and 1 ( ) 0LM q < when 0.155q < . Then the papers with quality (0.155,1.85)q∈ will be 
submitted to the low quality journal and the papers with quality higher than 1.85 will be 
submitted to the high quality journal in the first period. 
 
Next, we choose 0.85δ = so multiple-submission is possible and investigate how an author’s 
submission strategy changes as the publication benefit in high quality journal HB  changes. First, 
we choose a small publication benefit level in high quality journal 10HB = .The simulation result 
in following figure 15 shows that at first 1 ( )LM q is larger than 1 ( )HM q and , ( )H LM q , thus 
submitting to only the low quality journal in first period is the dominant strategy. Then 1 ( )HM q  
is larger than 1 ( )LM q  and , ( )H LM q as q increases, thus submitting to only the high quality 
journal is the dominant strategy. So submitting to both journals is always dominated by single 
submission. Thus, when the publication benefit in high quality journal is relatively small, authors 
will never choose multiple-submission. The simulation result shows that 1 ( )LM q and 
1 ( )HM q intersects at 2.69q = , and 1 ( ) 0LM q < when 0.15q < . Then the papers with quality 
(0.15,2.69)q∈ will be submitted to the low quality journal and the papers with quality higher 
than 2.69 will be submitted to the high quality journal in the first period. 
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Figure 15: Expected submission benefits when HB  is small 
 
 
Then, we choose a relative large value for the publication benefit in high quality journal 20HB =  
and keep the other parameters unchanged 5, 3, 1, 2, 1, 1, 0.85L H L H LB s s P P σ δ= = = = = = = .The 
simulation result in following figure 16 shows that as q increases from a low value, 1 ( )LM q is 
larger than 1 ( )HM q and , ( )H LM q , which means that submission in the low quality journal in first 
stage is the dominant strategy; As q increases to a middle value, , ( )H LM q is larger 
than 1 ( )LM q and 1 ( )HM q , then submitting to both journals is the optimal strategy; As q has a 
high value, 1 ( )HM q is larger than both 1 ( )LM q  and , ( )H LM q , and submitting to only high 
quality journal is the dominant strategy. Thus, when the publication benefit in high quality journal 
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is relatively large, authors will incorporate multiple-submission in their submission strategy. The 
simulation result shows that 1 ( )LM q and , ( )H LM q intersects at 1.88q = , 1 ( )HM q and 
, ( )H LM q intersects at 2.64q = ,  and 1 ( ) 0LM q < when 0.15q < . Then the papers with quality 
(0.15,1.88)q∈ will be submitted to the low quality journal, the papers with quality 
(1.88,2.64)q∈  will be submitted to both journals and the papers with quality higher than 2.64 
will be submitted to the high quality journal in the first period. 
 
 
1.5 2 2.5 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A paper's quality
S
u
b
m
is
s
io
n
 b
e
n
e
fi
t
M1L
M1H
MHL
 
 
Figure 16:  Expected submission benefits when HB  is relatively large 
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Last, choose parameters 5, 3, 1, 2, 1, 1, 0.95L H L H LB s s P P σ δ= = = = = = = . We perform a 
simulation to investigate how the quality thresholds 1q  change as the publication benefit in the 
high quality journal changes, which could show the possible submission strategies we stated in 
proposition 4. The simulation result shows that ˆ 0.1584Lq = , 0.2655
lq =  , 4 1.2139q = , 
645HB′′ = and 891
u
HB = . From figure 17, we know 1q decreases as HB  increases and approaches 
ˆLq  when HB  approaches the upper bound 891
u
HB = . When [ , ]
u
H H HB B B′′∈ , 1 ˆ[ , ]
l
Lq q q∈ and 
authors have the third submission strategy as we stated in proposition 4. Thus, when the 
publication benefit in high quality journal is large enough, authors will incorporate multiple-
submission in their submission strategy and the submission pattern in the first period is that 
L H HL H→ → → as the paper’s quality increases. 
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Figure 17:  Expected submission benefits when HB  is very large 
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We can also use numerical simulation to provide some insights on how the quality thresholds in 
the two-period multiple-submission case change as the referee’s quality assessment error varies. 
Let parameters take values 20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B S S P P= = = = = = and 0.85δ = , so 
multiple-submission is possible. The following figure 17 shows how the quality thresholds 
5 4,q q change as σ  varies, where 5q is the quality threshold of submitting to only the low quality 
journal versus both journals and 4q is the quality threshold of submitting to only the high quality 
journal versus both journals in the first period. 
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Figure 18: q5,q4 as quality assessment error changes 
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From above figure 18, we know that quality thresholds 5q and 4q decrease as the variance of  the 
referee’s quality assessment errorσ increases and the difference between 5q and 4q widens as 
σ increases, which means that fewer papers will be submitted to only the low quality journal and 
the number of papers submitted to both journals increase as the referee’s quality assessment gets 
less accurate.  
 
We can also do simulation to reproduce figure10 to show how quality thresholds, which 
determine the author’s submission strategy in the two-period and multiple-submission case, 
change as the discount factor δ  varies. Choosing the parameters to be 
20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B S S P P= = = = = =  and 1σ = , as the discount factor δ  changes from 0 
to 1, with a 0.05 increase in each step, we did a numerical simulation to calculate and plot the 
values of quality thresholds Lq , 0q and 5q and 4q , which determine the author’s submission 
strategy in the multiple-submission case according to the analysis in Corollary 5. The following 
figure 19 shows that 4q  decreases and 5q increases as δ  increases to the critical discount factor δˆ , 
which is consistent with figure 10. We know that the quality range in which multiple-submission 
occurs shrinks and authors are more likely to submit their papers to only one journal in the first 
period. Thus, there will be fewer papers submitted to both journals as authors become more 
patient. Also, if authors are sufficiently patient, the “multiple submissions” will always be 
dominated by “single submission”. In other words, authors would rather wait and resubmit their 
papers in the second period if rejected than simultaneously submit the papers to both journals in 
the first period if they are patient enough. 
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Figure 19: Quality thresholds as discount factor changes in multiple submissions 
 
 
We can also do simulation to show how the author’s quality threshold varies as both the variance 
of the referee’s quality assessment error and the author’s discount factor change. As authors’ 
discount factor changes from 0 to 1 and the variance of referee’s quality assessment error changes 
from 0.5 to 1 with 0.1 in each step, we did a numerical simulation on 4q  and 5q , which 
determine the author’s submission strategy in multiple-submission case. The simulation results 
are shown in the following figure 20 and 21. 
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Figure 20: q4 as referees’ assessment error and discount factor change 
 
 
 
From the above figure, we know that when the author’s discount factor is low, as the variance of 
the referee’s quality assessment error increases, 4q  increases. In other words, if authors are 
impatient, the quality threshold between submitting to only journalH and both journals increases 
when the referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate. Thus, it’s more likely for an author to 
submit the paper to both journals than only journal H  if the paper’s quality is relatively high. 
When authors are patient, 4q  decreases as referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate, and it’s 
more likely for an author to submit the paper to only the high quality journal than both journals. 
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Figure 21: q5 as referees’ assessment error and discount factor change 
 
 
 
From the above figure, we know that 5q increases as the variance of referee’s quality assessment 
error decreases and 5q increases as authors’ discount factor increases. In other words, as authors 
become more patient and referee’s quality assessment gets more accurate, the quality threshold of 
submitting to both journals and only journal L  increases, which implies that it’s more likely for 
an author to submit the paper to only the low quality journal than to both journals if the paper’s 
quality is relatively low.  
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4.3 Simulation on per-period submission number and average quality 
 
To illustrate that the per period number of submissions in the case of “multiple submissions” is 
higher  than that in the “single submission” case and that allowing multiple submission will not 
necessarily reduce the quality of published papers, we assume that each author produces a paper 
with the random quality [1,1]q N∼ and the referees’ assessment error [0,1]Nα ∼ , then according 
to the analysis in section 3.1 and 3.2, we can perform numerical simulations to see how the 
submission policy affects the expected quality of publications. The results from this simulation 
are reported in table 4 and table 5.
 5
  
 
The procedure of the simulation reported in table 4 and table 5 is as follows: 
1) Given a group of parameter values as shown in the first column of table 4, according to an 
author’s submission strategies in the case of “single submission” and “multiple submissions” 
illustrated in proposition 3 and corollary 4, we could get the quality thresholds 0q , ˆLq , 
1q 4q and 5q
6
, which are the critical quality thresholds determining the authors’ submission 
strategy in the two-period single and multiple-submission cases. 
 
2) According to the formulas (36),(37),(38) and (39) used to calculate the per-period number of 
submissions and the average quality of published papers in both journals under the “single 
submission” policy, we could get HN , LN , HQ  and LQ , which are the expected per-period 
number of submission and average quality of accepted papers in the high and low quality 
                                                 
5
 We used Matlab 7.0 to derive the results reported in table 4. 
 
6
 To calculate the quality thresholds in Matlab, we use the “finding zeros of functions” in the optimization 
toolbox and “cumulative normal distribution functions” in the statistical toolbox to do the numerical 
calculation. 
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journals in the two-period and single submission case. Similarly, according to the formulas in 
(54), (55), (56) and (57) we could calculate MSHN ,
MS
LN ,
MS
HQ  and 
MS
LQ ,
7
 which are the 
expected per-period number of submission and average quality of accepted papers in the high 
and low quality journals in the two-period and multiple-submission case. 
 
 
Table 4 
Quality thresholds and critical discount rates
0.1584
0.2353
0.1584
0.2937
0.1584
0.6584
0.1584
0.1584
0.9437
0.9383
0.9362
0.9296
0.9328
0.9281
0.95
0.9345
2.6412      2.4186
2.5495      2.3403
2.6412       2.5196
2.4798        2.3849
2.6412        2.4993
2.5586        2.3209
3.1697        2.9574
3.1001        2.4186
1.7184
1.7184
1.7794
1.7184
1.8497
1.7184
2.2184
1.7184
1.8823
1.8629
1.9728
1.8823
2.0268
1.8738
2.3865
1.8758
1.9697
1.9344
2.0564
1.9526
2.0929
1.94
2.4833
2.0752
Critical qualities and 
discount
rates
Parameters
20, 5; 3, 1
2, 1; 0.85, 1000
H L H L
H L
B B s s
P P Nδ
= =   = =
= =  = =
ˆLq 5q0q δˆ4q1q
4.5LB =
1.2LP =
1.5Ls =
2.5HP =
3.5Hs =
0 .7δ =
18HB =
ˆHq
 
 
Table 4 shows the calibration results for those quality thresholds determining the author’s 
submission strategies in both the single and multiple submission cases, and also reports the 
                                                 
7
 After getting the quality thresholds which determine authors’ submission strategies in both single and 
multiple-submission policy regimes, we use the “cumulative normal distribution functions” and “numerical 
integration functions” to numerically calculate the expected per-period number of submissions and the 
average quality of submitted papers in both journals 
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critical discount rates under different groups of parameters, from which we could know whether 
some authors will choose multiple submission. 
 
Table 5:   Per-period number of submissions and average quality of papers accepted for 
publication in both journals under the two different policy regimes
Average quality of 
the  accepted 
papers in high and 
low quality 
journals
Average quality 
of the accepted 
papers in high 
and low quality 
journals
Per-period number   of 
submissions in high and low 
quality journals
Per-period 
number     
of submissions  
in  high and low 
quality  journals
1.549
1.56
1.549
1.562
1.549
1.757
1.604
1.588
2.66
2.65
2.70
2.66
2.736
2.643
3.03
2.657
773.88      138.43
748.15      133.48
773.88      114.96
727.60      119.34
773.88      101.89
604.41      131.57
792.40       67.78
788.07      172.71
198.88
203.17
175.40
198.88
160.22
208.46
85.59
200.32
1.507
1.52
1.51
1.53
1.512
1.72
1.57
1.51
2.695
2.68
2.74
2.69
2.766
2.66
3.09
2.74
746.94
723.40
750.28
706.30
751.74
579.51
779.83
751.03
180.22
187.63
158.56
183.78
147.35
196.95
72.84
159.08
Multiple    submissionsSingle     submission
Policy 
Regimes
Parameter
Values
HN LN HQ LQ
MS
HN
MS
LN
MS
HQ
MS
LQ
4.5LB =
18HB =
1.2LP =
2.5HP =
3.5Hs =
1.5Ls =
0.7δ =
,H LN
ɶ
20, 5; 3, 1
2, 1; 0.85, 1000
H L H L
H L
B B s s
P P Nδ
= =   = =
= =  = =
 Note: The above numerical results in table 3 are calculated from Matlab programming.  
 
The first four columns in table 5 are the results in the case of “single submission” and the last 
four columns report the results in the case of “multiple submissions”. The rows give the results 
under different parameter values. Given the set of parameter values, we can compare the expected 
per-period number of submissions and the average quality of accepted papers in both journals 
under the two policy regimes. We can also see from the table how the submission number and 
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average quality of accepted papers change as the parameters change.  The first row gives the 
results under a set of base parameter values. The other seven rows report the results when we 
change only one of the parameter values and hold the others as constants, and we can compare the 
results to the base scenario in the first row.  
 
At first, we reduce the benefits of publication in the journals and the results are shown in the 
second and third rows. When the benefit of publishing papers in the low quality journal is 
reduced from 5 to 4.5, the expected per-period number of submissions to journal L  decreases 
from 746.94 to 723.4 under “single submission” and decreases from 773.88 to 748.15 under 
“multiple submissions”, and the average quality of the accepted papers in journal L  increases 
under both policy regimes. When the low quality journal’s publication benefit decreases, it 
becomes less attractive and fewer low quality papers will be submitted to journal L , thus the 
average quality of accepted papers will increase. At the same time, the number of submissions to 
the high quality journal will increase and the average quality of papers accepted for publication in 
journal H will decrease under both policy regimes. As the low quality journal’s publication 
benefit decreases, the high quality journal becomes more attractive and more papers which were 
submitted to journal L  originally will be submitted to journalH , thus decrease the average 
quality of accepted papers in the high quality journal. In addition, the number of papers submitted 
to both journals in the multiple-submission case will decrease from 138.48 to 133.48. 
 
When the benefit of publication in the high quality journal is reduced from 20 to 18, the 
submission number in journalH decreases and the average quality of accepted papers in journal 
H increases under both policy regimes. Although the submission number in journal L  increases, 
the average quality of accepted papers in journal L  also increases under “single submission”, and 
both the submission number and the average quality of accepted papers in journal L  remain the 
same under “multiple submission”. Because decreasing the high quality journal’s publication 
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benefit will not affect the quality threshold of submitting to only the high quality journal and both 
journals in the first period since there is no change on the expected submission benefit on the low 
quality journal, thus there will be no change on the submission number and average quality of 
accepted papers in journal L  in the multiple-submission case. The forth and fifth rows show the 
results as we raise the prices of submission to the journals. Not surprisingly, the results are similar 
as what are shown in the second and third rows because increasing the submission prices has the 
same effect on the authors’ welfare as decreasing the benefits of publication in the journals.  
 
The sixth and seventh rows report the results as we increase the journals’ standards. When the 
low quality journal’s standard Ls is raised from 1 to 1.5, the per-period number of submissions to 
journal L  decreases from 746.94 to 579.51 under “single submission” and decreases from 773.88 
to 604.41 under “multiple submission”, and the average quality of the papers accepted for 
publication in journal L  increases under both policy regimes. At the same time, the number of 
submissions to journal H increases and the average quality of accepted papers in journal 
H decreases under both policy regimes. As the low quality journal’s standard increases, fewer 
low quality papers will be submitted to journal L  and the average quality of accepted papers will 
increase. Also, the high quality journal becomes more attractive and some papers will be switched 
from journal L  to H , thus the submission number increases and the average quality of accepted 
papers decreased in the high quality journal. As we increase the high quality journal’s standard 
Hs  from 3 to 3.5, the number of submissions to journal H decreases and the average quality of 
accepted papers in journal H increases under both policy regimes.  Although the number of 
submissions to journal L  increases, the average quality of accepted papers in journal L  also 
increases under both policy regimes. As the high quality journal’s standard increases, fewer low 
quality papers will be submitted to journal H  and the average quality of accepted papers will 
increase. Also, the low quality journal becomes more attractive and some papers will be switched 
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from journal H to L , thus the submission number increases and the average quality of accepted 
papers also increases in the low quality journal. 
 
At last, we decrease the discount factor from 0.85 to 0.7, which implies that authors in the 
economy become less patient. From the results shown in the last row, we can see that under 
“single submission”, the per-period number of submissions decreases in the high quality journal 
and increases in the low quality journal. This is not surprising. The intuition is that  when only 
allowing single submission in each period, the author’s trade off between submitting to the high 
and low quality journal, and as they become less patient they are less capable of suffering from no 
publication today, thus they’d rather submit to the low quality than the high quality journal today 
because if they are rejected by journal H they can just get a  small discounted expected payoff  
by submitting their papers to journal L  tomorrow. Under “multiple submissions”, as the authors 
get less patient, the per-period number of submissions to both journals will increase from 198.88 
to 200.32. The intuition is that when “multiple submissions” is allowed the authors trade off 
between submitting their papers today and tomorrow, as they discount the future less they are 
more willing to wait until tomorrow to submit.  
 
As shown in table 5, the average quality of accepted papers in the low quality journal under 
“multiple submissions” is greater than its counterpart under “single submission”. Therefore, 
allowing multiple submissions may not necessarily deteriorate the quality of published papers.  
 
As the variance of the referee’s quality assessment error decreases, e.g. 0.01σ = , the calibration 
results for quality thresholds, the per-period number of submission and average quality of 
accepted papers are reported in table 6 and table 7 respectively. 
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Table 6  
Quality thresholds and critical discount rates when referee’s assessment is precise
0.9916 0.95362.9968     2.99482.9872 2.9889 2.9899
Critical qualities and 
discount
rates
Parameters
20, 5; 3, 1
2, 1; 0.85, 1000
0.01
H L H L
H L
B B s s
P P Nδ
σ
= =   = =
= =  = =
=
ˆLq 5q0q δˆ4q1q ˆHq
 
As shown in table 6, when the referee’s quality assessment is getting very accurate, the quality 
thresholds of submitting to the high (low) quality journal under both submission policy regimes 
are very close to its quality standard 3Hs =  ( 1Ls = ).  This is not surprising because as noises on 
quality assessment go away, only those papers with quality matching journals’ standards will be 
accepted for publication. Authors know this fact and will act accordingly since submission is 
costly. 
 
Still assuming that 20, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1H L H L H LB B S S P P= = = = = = , 0.85δ = and 1000N = , 
compared with the results shown in table 5, we know that when the referee’s quality assessment 
gets more accurate, or as σ decreases from 1 to 0.01,  per-period number of submissions to the 
high and low quality journals decrease significantly under both the single and multiple-
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submission policy regimes. The average quality of accepted papers in both high and low quality 
journals increase in the single submission and the multiple-submission cases. This is because that 
under the chosen parameters or as the ratios of publication benefits to publication costs are 
relatively high, both the quality thresholds of submitting to the high and low quality journals are 
below their quality standards, and the average quality of accepted papers will approach toward 
the quality standards thus increase as the referee’s quality assessment becomes more accurate. 
 
Table 7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We did numerical simulation to show how the per-period number of submission and average 
quality of accepted papers in the high and low quality journals vary as authors’ discount rates and 
referees quality assessment error change under both the single and multiple submission policy 
regimes. As authors’ discount rates change from 0 to 1 and the variance of referee’s quality  
Per-period number and average quality of submission when referee’s assessment is 
precise
Av erage quality of 
the  accepted 
papers in high and 
low quality 
journals
Av erage quality 
of  the accepted 
papers in high 
and low quality 
journals
Per-period number   of 
submissions in high and low 
quality journals
Per-period 
number     
of  submissions  
in  high and low 
quality  journals
1.72383.3737480.74      0.43423.371.72353.3738480.6523.30
Multiple    submissionsSingle     submission
Policy 
Regimes
Parameter
Values
HN LN HQ LQ
MS
HN
MS
LN
MS
HQ
MS
LQ
,H L
Nɶ
20, 5; 3, 1
2, 1; 0.85, 1000
0.01
H L H L
H L
B B s s
P P Nδ
σ
= =   = =
= =  = =
=
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assessment error changes from 0.5 to 1 with 0.1 in each step, the simulation results on per-period 
submission number are shown in the following figures.  
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Figure 22:  Expected per-period number of submission to the high quality journal under 
single submission policy 
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Figure 23:  Expected per-period number of submission to the low quality journal under 
single submission policy 
 
 
 
 
From the numerical simulation results, we know that under single submission policy, the 
expected per-period submission number to the high quality journal increases as authors become 
more patient and also increases as referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate.  HN  in single 
submission case reaches the highest level when 1δ = and 1σ = . The expected per-period 
submission number to the low quality journal decreases as authors become more patient and 
increases as referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate. LN  in single submission has the 
largest value when 0δ = and 1σ = . 
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Figure 24: Expected per-period number of submission to the high quality journal under 
multiple-submission policy 
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Figure 25: Expected per-period number of submission to the low quality journal under 
multiple-submission policy 
 
 
 
 
From the numerical simulation results, we know that under multiple submission policy, the 
expected per-period number of submissions to the high quality journal increases as the referee’s 
quality assessment gets less accurate and it decreases as authors become more patient when 
discount factor is relatively small. But MSHN  will increase as authors become more patient when 
the discount factor is large. MSHN  reaches the highest level when 1δ = and 1σ = . The expected 
per-period submission number to the low quality journal decreases as authors become more 
patient and increases as referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate. MSLN  has the largest value 
when 0δ = and 1σ = . 
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Figure 26: Expected per-period number of submission to both journals under multiple-
submission policy 
 
 
From the numerical simulation results, we know that under multiple submission policy, the 
expected per-period submission number to both the high and low quality journal decreases as 
authors become more patient and it increases as the referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate. 
When authors become more patient, they would rather wait and re-submit in next period if 
rejected than submit the papers to both journals simultaneously in the first period, thus HLN  will 
decrease. When the referee’s quality assessment gets less accurate, authors will more likely to use 
this chance to submit papers which may not be submitted when the referee has an accurate quality 
assessment. HLN  reaches the highest level when 0δ = and 1σ = . 
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Similarly, we did numerical simulations to show how the average quality of accepted papers in 
the high and low quality journals vary as authors’ discount rates and the referee’s quality 
assessment error change under both the single and multiple submission policy regimes. As 
authors’ discount rates change from 0 to 1 and the variance of the referee’s quality assessment 
error changes from 0.5 to 1 with 0.1 in each step, the simulation results on average quality are 
shown in the following figures.  
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Figure 27: Average quality of accepted papers in the high quality journal under single 
submission policy 
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Figure 28: Average quality of accepted papers in the low quality journal under single 
submission policy 
 
 
 
From the numerical simulation results, we know that under a single submission policy, the 
average quality of papers accepted in the high quality journal HQ  decreases as the referee’s 
quality assessment becomes less accurate and it also decreases as authors become more patient. 
The average quality of papers accepted in low quality journal LQ  decreases as the referee’s 
quality assessment becomes less accurate and it also decreases as authors become more patient.  
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From the numerical simulation results shown in figure 29 and figure 30, we know that under 
multiple submission policy, the average quality of papers accepted in the high quality journal 
MS
HQ  decreases as the referee’s quality assessment becomes less accurate and it increases as 
authors become more patient. The average quality of papers accepted in low quality journal MSLQ  
decreases as the referee’s quality assessment becomes less accurate and it decreases as authors 
become more patient. 
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Figure 29:  Average quality of accepted papers in the high quality journal under multiple- 
submission policy 
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Figure 30:  Average quality of accepted papers in the low quality journal under multiple- 
submission policy 
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have investigated an author’s submission strategies in both the case of single and multiple 
submissions. We find that given the ratio of publication benefit to submission fee in the low 
quality journal, if authors’ are patient enough they will never submit their papers to both journals 
simultaneously. Otherwise, whether the multiple-submission may occur in their optimal 
submission strategy depends on the magnitude of the publication benefit in the high quality 
journal. When the publication benefit in the high quality journal is small enough, authors will 
never include multiple-submission in their strategy. When the publication benefit in the high 
quality journal is relatively large, multiple-submission is possible and an author’s strategy 
depends on the paper’s quality. As the paper’s quality increases, the submission decision changes 
from submitting to only the low quality journal, to submitting to both journals then to submitting 
to only the high quality journal. When the publication benefit in the high quality journal is large 
enough, an author’s submission decision changes from submitting to only the low quality journal, 
to submitting to only the high quality journal, to submitting to both journals, then to submitting to 
only the high quality journal as the paper’s quality increases. 
 
Through numerical simulations, we analyzed authors’ submission strategies and investigated how 
the expected per-period number of submission and average quality of published papers in both 
journals change as the author’s discount factor and the referee’s quality assessment error change. 
We find that if multiple submissions were allowed, the average quality of accepted papers for 
publication could be higher or lower than that in the single submission case. Therefore, allowing 
multiple submissions may not necessarily deteriorate the average quality of published papers. In 
addition, we find that, as authors become less patient they are more likely to choose multiple 
submissions. If authors are patient enough, single submission will be the dominant strategy. In 
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reality, multiple submissions are prohibited by most of the academic journals, thus those authors 
who are impatient or have small discount factors will be worse off under the prevailing single 
submission policy. From the simulation results we know that allowing multiple submissions may 
not necessarily deteriorate journals’ quality. The simulation results also show that a less (more) 
patient author is more likely to submit his paper to the low (high) quality journal. 
 
Our model is based on four main assumptions. First, we assume that authors are identical and this 
is embodied in two aspects: 1) In each period they produce one paper with the same distributed 
random quality; 2) They have the same discount factor. In reality, some authors are more patient 
than others. If we assume that authors have heterogeneous discount factors, the results of 
comparing expected per-period number of submissions under the two policy regimes will be 
different. The second assumption of our model is that the quality standards of journals are 
common knowledge and authors know the quality of their papers perfectly. This assumption is 
different from what’s analyzed in Ellison (2002b). In his paper, Ellison assumed that the quality 
standards of journals are social norms and authors are subject to overconfidence bias (they think 
their papers are slightly better than they really are). Referees don’t know the standards perfectly 
and their efforts of trying to conform to social norms will eventually lead to a shift of the social 
norms, given the assumption that authors are subject to overconfidence bias. In our model, the 
quality standards of journals are common knowledge so there is no shift of social norms, and 
because we assume authors know their papers’ quality perfectly, they would not update the 
information according to their submission history. If we assume authors don’t have perfect 
information about their papers’ quality, then their submission strategies will be dependent on the 
referee’s decision or their submission history. Our third assumption is that the errors in the 
referee’s assessment of a paper’s quality are uncorrelated. Finally, we assume that there are only 
two journals in the economy, thus a paper can be submitted at most twice. Without these 
assumptions, the results will be different from what we get in previous analysis. What happens to 
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author’s submission strategies if we change these assumptions are waiting for further 
investigation.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Notations to be used in the dissertation 
 
 
 
Notations to be used in the single period case in Chapter 3 
 
Notation Description 
( )j qπ  the probability of being accepted for 
publication in journal j , ,j H L=  
( )jM q  expected payoff of submission in 
journal j in single submission single period 
case , ,j H L=  
, ( )H LM q  expected payoff of submitting to both 
journals 
ˆHq  the quality threshold between submitting to 
high and low quality journal in single 
submission single period case ( ˆHq is 
determined by ˆ ˆ( ) ( )H H L HM q M q= ) 
ˆLq  the quality threshold between submitting to 
low quality journal and no submission in 
single submission single period case ( ˆLq  is 
determined by ˆ( ) 0L LM q = ) 
 
0q  the quality at which the expected submission 
benefit in high quality journal is zero ( 0q  is 
Notations Description 
q  a paper’s quality 
( )F q  ( )q F q∼  and ( )F q is the cumulative density 
function of q and ( )f q is the probability 
density function of q  
s  Referees’ quality assessment 
α  Referee’s quality assessment error 
( s q α= + ) 
( )G α  ( )Gα α∼  and ( )g α is the . .p d f  of α  
HB  Publication benefit in high quality journal 
LB  Publication benefit in low quality journal 
Hs  Quality standard of high quality journal 
Ls  Quality standard of low quality journal 
HP  Submission fee charged by high quality 
journal 
LP  Submission fee charged by low quality 
journal 
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determined by 0( ) 0HM q = ) 
 
2q  the quality threshold of submitting to only 
journal H and both journals in single period 
( 2q  is determined by 2 , 2( ) ( )H H LM q M q= ) 
 
3q  the quality threshold of submitting to both 
journals and only journal L  in single period 
( 3q  is determined by 3 , 3( ) ( )L H LM q M q= ) 
 
 
 
 
Notations to be used in the multiple-period case in Chapter 3 
 
δ  Authors’ discount factor and [0,1]δ ∈  
δˆ  the critical discount factor, when ˆδ δ>  
single submission is the dominant strategy 
, ( )H LM q  expected payoff of submitting to both 
journals 
1 ( )HM q  expected payoff of submitting to both 
journals 
1 ( )LM q  expected payoff of submitting to 
journal L  in first period 
1q  quality threshold of submitting to 
journal H and L in first period ( 1q is 
determined by 1 1 1 1( ) ( )H LM q M q= ) 
 
4q  quality threshold of submitting to only 
journal H and both journals in first period 
( 4q  is determined by , 4 1 4( ) ( )H L HM q M q= ) 
5q  quality threshold of submitting to only 
journal L  and both journals in first period 
( 5q  is determined by , 5 1 5( ) ( )H L LM q M q= ) 
 
jN  expected per-period number of submissions 
to journal j  in single submission, ,j H L=  
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jQ  the average quality of the papers accepted for 
publication in journal j  in single submission, 
,j H L=  
 
MS
jN  
expected per-period number of submissions 
to journal j  in multiple submissions, 
,j H L=  
 
MS
jQ  
the average quality of the papers accepted for 
publication in journal j  in multiple 
submissions, ,j H L=  
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